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Abstract
Shale gas development has become big business in the United States during the past decade,
introducing drilling to parts of the country that have not seen it in decades and provoking an
accelerating shift in the country's energy profile. State governments, which have historically
regulated the oil and gas industry and continue to do so today, were in many cases caught by
surprise by the speed and the scale of the shale gas boom and are still trying to update and
adapt their regulatory practices to respond to the impacts that shale gas development is
causing in communities in their states. In some instances, these impacts have included
groundwater and surface water contamination, air pollution, exploded homes, and damage to
wetlands and other habitats, among other impacts. Shale gas development has also created
jobs, brought economic development to distressed communities, lowered fuel costs, and has
begun to supplant coal in the nation's electricity supply.
The thesis seeks to understand whether primary regulatory authority over shale gas
development should rest with the states or with the federal government. In answering this
question, the author applies theory from the field of regulatory federalism to the practice of
shale gas development to ascertain whether the federal government or state governments are
best suited to regulate shale gas development. Grounding the analysis in both regulations as-
written and as-applied in a number of states that have active shale gas industries, the author
uses four key criteria to gauge whether regulatory authority should rest with the central
government or with the states. These four criteria are: the geographic distribution of costs and
benefits associated with shale gas development; regulatory capacity at the federal level and at
the state level; which level can better foster innovation, flexibility, and adaptability; and which
level can better provide efficiency, certainty, and stability. The analysis finds that, in most
cases, states are better situated than the federal government to regulate shale gas
development on the basis of each of the four criteria. The author also subjects current
regulatory practice to a two-part test to determine whether regulatory failure is currently
occurring that would compel the federal government to assume regulatory authority. The
results from this test are negative. The author concludes that primary regulatory authority over
shale gas development should remain with state governments. Finally, the author provides
four policy recommendations, two each to state governments and to the federal government,
to improve regulatory practice and outcomes in the future.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence Susskind
Title: Ford Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
A Snapshot of Shale Gas Development
Exploration of the possibility of extracting natural gas from shale first began in the 1970s when
declining production from conventional gas deposits spurred the U.S. Department of Energy to
initiate the Eastern Gas Shales Project in 1976.1 Technological advances over the following
twenty years in the technologies of hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling, and the use of fiber
optics in microseismic imaging allowed for the first successful commercial shale gas
development in Texas' Barnett Shale in 1997.2 Shale gas production spread from the Barnett to
other shales in Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas in the mid-2000s and sparked a rush in the
Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania in 2008 after a report by Professors Terry Engelder and Gary
Lash estimated that estimates of recoverable natural gas in the Marcellus were up to 250 times
larger than previously thought.3 A map of shale plays in the lower 48 states is included in Figure
1 to provide a visual representation of the varied locations in which shale gas (and oil)
development is occurring.
1 Alex Trembath et al., Where the Shale Gas Revolution Came From: Government's Role in the
Development of Hydraulic Fracturing in Shale.
2 Railroad Commission of Texas, "Water Use in the Barnett Shale."
3 "Unconventional Natural Gas Reservoir In Pennsylvania Poised To Dramatically Increase US
Production."
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The boom in shale gas production in recent years is rapidly altering projections for future
energy supply and usage both in the United States. The U.S. Energy Information Administration
(EIA) estimates that the United States will transition from being a net importer of natural gas to
being a net exporter early during the next decade.4 In addition, electricity generated from
natural gas has already begun to supplant electricity from coal-fired power plants and the EIA
projects that this trend will continue over the next 25 years.5 These transitions are projected to
be largely driven by shale gas, as the share of U.S. natural gas production from shale is expected
to grow from 23 percent in 2010 to 49 percent in 2035.6 The sharp uptick in natural gas
production is creating a number of positive benefits, including cheaper natural gas, economic
development and wealth generation in localities where extraction is taking place, and reduced
carbon emissions.7
The process of shale gas development includes many stages both before and after the hydraulic
fracturing procedure that has commanded significant public attention. Laying out these steps
here will provide some context for understanding the myriad regulations governing shale gas
development that will be discussed in this paper. In contrast to the comparatively straight-
forward process of conventional drilling, the structure of shale does not allow hydrocarbons to
flow through a vertical well to the surface at an economical rate. In order to extract the gas
and oil that is trapped in shale, a relatively complex, multi-stage development process is
required. First, the shale gas operator conducts seismographic testing to locate a promising site
in which to drill for gas. Having decided on a site, the operator constructs a well pad, which is a
large cement platform that hosts the well (and in the case of shale gas development, often
multiple wells) and other associated equipment.8 The next step is to drill the well itself and
case it; casing involves the installation of concentric steel tubes of varying diameters and
lengths, all secured by cement.9 Once drilling reaches the depth at which the shale gas is
found, it usually proceeds horizontally in order to maximize exposure to the resource. During
drilling, fluid called "produced water" usually flows to the surface through the well and must be
4 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2012, 3.
s Ibid., 3-4.
6 Ibid., 3.
Although natural gas generally produces fewer greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions than does coal, there
are some concerns about leakage of methane directly into the atmosphere during the production and
transport processes. Two studies that come to differing conclusions about the GHG footprint of shale
gas production are: Timothy J. Skone, Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Analysis of Natural Gas Extraction &
Delivery in the United States; and Howarth, Santoro, and Ingraffea, "Methane and the Greenhouse-gas
Footprint of Natural Gas from Shale Formations."
8 N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining
Regulatory Program," 5-91 -97.
9 Ibid., 5-91 -97.
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disposed of along with other drilling wastes such as drill cuttings (mostly rock that comes out of
the well) and used drilling fluids.10
After the well is drilled and casing has been installed, the well is hydraulically fractured. The
process of hydraulic fracturing involves punching holes into the portion of the well that has
been drilled through gas-containing shale and forcefully injecting high volumes of fracturing
fluids (comprised of water, sand or ceramic "propping" agents that hold fractures open, and a
specialized cocktail of chemicals) down the well and out through the holes into the surrounding
rock." The fracturing fluid fractures the rock, creating passageways by which the gas can flow
out of the rock in which it was trapped and through the well to the surface.' The entire well is
not fractured at once but rather in stages of a few feet at a time. Usually, some quantity of the
solution that is injected into the well returns to the surface; this fluid is called "flowback water"
and must also be disposed of.' 3 The operator installs equipment at the wellhead to control and
collect the natural gas that is flowing to the surface and uses pipes to transport the gas to a
processing plant. Figure 2 presents a diagram that illustrates some aspects of the shale gas
development process, with a focus on hydraulic fracturing.
10
11
12
13
Ibid., 5-91 -97.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Figure 2: Illustration of Shale
Gas Development Process
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Risks Presented by Shale Gas Development
Much of the public concern around shale gas development has focused on hydraulic fracturing,
and specifically on the potential for contamination of groundwater resources by the injection of
chemicals used in the hydraulic fracturing process. While this risk is real and must be guarded
against, there are numerous other risks to human health and safety and environmental
wellbeing that also are posed by the shale gas development process. Reviewing these risks
here will help the reader to understand the purpose of the myriad regulations governing shale
gas development.
Each of the steps in the shale gas development process described in the previous section
creates the potential for human or environmental harm. Although all of the potential effects
will not be described here, a sampling will illustrate the diversity of potential impacts.' 4 For
example, testing for locations in which to drill gas wells often involves the use of large trucks
called "thumpers" that strike the ground with sufficient force to cause it to vibrate and shake.' 5
This can cause damage to nearby buildings and water wells. Construction of well pads and
access roads can fragment natural habitat and cause erosion that washes into nearby
waterways.' 6 The casing and cementing of natural gas wells can be faulty or can deteriorate
over time, thereby allowing fluids to pass between the well and surrounding media, including
groundwater.' 7 High volume hydraulic fracturing, the kind used in shale gas development,
accentuates this risk by placing increased pressure on casing when fracturing fluid is pumped
down the well at high pressures.' 8 Water for drilling and hydraulic fracturing must be obtained
from somewhere, usually either local surface water or groundwater sources, and high volumes
of water withdrawal can adversely impact local ecology and other water users.1' Various
materials used in the drilling process, including water and chemicals for drilling and hydraulic
fracturing must be trucked in or transported via pipeline (in which case pipelines must be laid)
and stored on site before and after use, creating the possibility that substances may be
spilled. 0 Waste products including flowback water, produced water, used fracturing and
14 For a comprehensive review of the risks presented by shale gas development and policy
recommendations for mitigating these risks, see, Wiseman, "Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy"
(forthcoming, 2013).
15 "How Thumper Trucks Work - Trucks That Create Earthquakes to Do Underground Imaging."
1 N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining
Regulatory Program," 6-68.
1 Osborn et al., "Methane Contamination of Drinking Water Accompanying Gas-well Drilling and
Hydraulic Fracturing."
18 Ibid.
19 N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining
Regulatory Program," ES-9.
20 Ibid., 6-315.
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drilling fluids, drill cuttings, and other industrial products can also spill during on-site storage
and transportation for disposal.21 In addition, all of these wastes - many contaminated with
chemicals from the fracturing and drilling processes, or very high mineral content or low-level
radioactivity picked up from rocks deep underground - must be disposed of, and operators
have struggled to come up with safe disposal methods. 2 The drilling and fracturing processes
also release volatile organic compounds, methane (a very potent greenhouse gas), and other
pollutants into the air, both from the well and also from the running of diesel engines on the
well pad and the heavy truck traffic that accompanies drilling.
Most of these risks are not specific to shale gas development and are part and parcel of any
operation that drills for oil and natural gas. There are some risks that are particular to shale gas
development, such as the larger quantities and greater diversity of chemicals used in hydraulic
fracturing, the greater pressure placed on the well casing, and the significantly larger volumes
of water that must be withdrawn and ultimately disposed of, that are associated with high
volume hydraulic fracturing. But even these risks are not unique to shale gas development as
hydraulic fracturing is coming into increased usage to stimulate wells that are not drilled into
shale also. It should be highlighted, however, that the recent boom in drilling caused by the
shale gas boom has significantly increased the number of wells that are drilled each year and
has expanded drilling activity to areas that previously had relatively little. Not only does this
increased activity increase the likelihood of adverse social and environmental impacts, it also
magnifies the risks associated with cumulative environmental impacts.
While all of the risks catalogued here, among many others, are real, there still remains
significant contention and controversy about the likelihood of adverse impact from shale gas
development and the severity of consequence if adverse events do occur. Simply stated,
scientists, policy-makers, and regulators know that risks of various kinds exist but are still
struggling to understand the severity of these risks and how to prioritize them. In the
meantime, claims and counterclaims have proliferated and proponents and opponents of shale
gas development grasp at the limited information available to make their respective cases. For
example, to cite perhaps the most prominent controversy related to shale gas development
and hydraulic fracturing, there exists significant public concern regarding the threat of
contamination of groundwater resources by the chemicals that are contained within fracturing
21 Ibid.
2 Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 126.
23 Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Northcentral Pennsylvania Marcellus Shale
Short-Term Ambient Air Sampling Report; Howarth, Santoro, and Ingraffea, "Methane and the
Greenhouse-gas Footprint of Natural Gas from Shale Formations."
24 Wiseman, "Fracturing Regulation Applied," 365.
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fluids. 25 Numerous regulators, researchers, and industry sources have stated that the threat to
groundwater does not arise from hydraulic fracturing itself but rather from poorly constructed
wells that can suffer blowouts or otherwise allow for fluid travel between the wellbore and
26
surrounding groundwater sources. Contrary to these assertions, however, an EPA study
found likely groundwater due to seepage of fracturing chemicals through rock in Pavillion,
Wyoming and a recent study modeled the accelerated rate by which this travel could occur.
The methodologies and utility of both of these findings have been heatedly debated,
28however. In addition, concerns and criticisms have been raised about claims that, as long as
wells are constructed properly, the risk of groundwater contamination is minimized by
allegations that drilling companies are aware that the cement around wells begins to degrade
within years, not decades, and that this can lead to accelerated well failure.29 This debate is
nowhere near its conclusion and even EPA's ongoing study about groundwater contamination
may very well fail to settle the matter.
Current Regulatory Structure
Oil and gas production has historically been regulated primarily by the states. States and some
municipalities passed the first regulations governing oil drilling (and later, drilling for natural
gas) in the 1930s in an effort to "conserve" oil (that is, promote orderly development of
reservoirs so that oil was not "wasted" and left unrecovered underground) and to protect oil
wells from contamination by groundwater.3 0 Sporadically, different states also enacted
legislation and promulgated rules designed to guard against risks to public health and
environmental damage during succeeding decades.3' The wave of federal environmental
legislation that was enacted during the 1970s also sparked the passage of environmental
legislation at the state level, and some of these regulations apply to oil and gas development.
25 Clean Water Action, "Fracking."
2 See, for example, Urbina, "Tainted Water Well Challenges Claim of Fracking's Safety"; Elizabeth Ames
Jones, Chairman Railroad Commission of Texas, Review of Hydraulic Fracturing Technology; David Neslin
Director, Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, Natural Gas Drilling: Public Health and
Environmental Impacts.
2 Myers, "Potential Contaminant Pathways from Hydraulically Fractured Shale to Aquifers"; US EPA,
"Pavillion."
2 See, for example, Jim Efstathiou Jr, "Fracking Fluids May Migrate to Aquifers, Researcher Says";
Christopher Helman, "Questions Emerge On EPA's Wyoming Fracking Study - Forbes."
292Josh Fox, The Sky Is Pink.
30 Ground Water Protection Council, State Oil and Natural Gas Regulations Designed to Protect Water
Resources, 13.
32 Ibid., 14.
32 Ibid., 14-15; Barry G. Rabe, "Power to the States: The Promise and Pitfalls of Decentralization," 34-35.
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As will be detailed in Chapter 3, state regulation covers the entire process of shale gas
development (and drilling for natural gas and oil more broadly) from beginning to end. States
regulate testing for natural gas, the location of gas wells and well pads, the construction of well
pads, the construction of wells, the withdrawal of water for drilling and hydraulic fracturing,
disclosure of chemicals used, spill prevention and reporting, testing and replacing contaminated
water supplies, and the storage and disposal of wastes. The bulk of these regulations are
written and enforced by the states, although most states also have primacy to apply applicable
state regulation under the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, and Safe Drinking Water Act. As will
be detailed in Chapter 3, the states have adopted a wide range of approaches to regulating
shale gas development, with some adopting stricter environmental and public safety and health
protections and some setting standards that are more lax, and with some states favoring
prescriptive regulations and other states favoring performance standards. Each state sets its
own unique, implicit balance between reaping the benefits and mitigating the costs of shale gas
development. States also take a variety of approaches to enforcing regulations, as will be
described in Chapter 4, with different states focusing only on certain types of violations and
each state issuing comparatively fewer or more notices of violation, and administering fewer or
more fines, for different types of violations, of varying dollar amounts.
The federal government also regulates certain aspects of shale gas development, although
there is not federal legislation that focuses on onshore drilling and exemptions have been
created in some of the federal environmental regulations that would otherwise apply to shale
gas development. Remembering that various exemptions apply, the federal laws (and
associated rules and regulations) that apply to aspects of the shale gas development process
are the Clean Water Act; and Clean Air Act; the Safe Drinking Water Act; Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; the Endangered Species Act; the
Migratory Birds Treaty Act; the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act; and the
Occupational Safety and Health Act.
Finally, although this thesis focuses on state and federal regulation of shale gas, some local
governments also exercise some regulatory authority.33 Different states have adopted very
different approaches to granting localities jurisdiction to manage their engagement with
fracturing, with some allowing broad latitude and others keeping all decision-making within the
statehouse. Texas has relatively lax statewide regulations but allows municipalities significant
33 For additional descriptions and discussions of local regulation of shale gas development and oil and
gas development, see Kennedy, "The Exercise of Local Control Over Gas Extraction"; Kramer, "Local Land
Use Regulation of Extractive Industries"; Sorell E. Negro, "Fracking Wars: Federal, State and Local
Conflicts over the Regulation of Natural Gas Activities"; Charles Davis, Fracking and Sub-state
Federalism: State Preemption of Local Regulatory Decisions in Colorado.
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latitude to set stricter regulations. For example, the city of Fort Worth, which is estimated to
have over 1,000 wells within the city limits, sets its own fees for drilling permits and requires a
significant commitment on the part of operators to minimize and mitigate adverse impacts. As
a condition of receiving a permit, the city requires (among many other items) submission of a
Stormwater Pollution Prevention Plan, a Noise Management Plan, and a City-Wide Road
Maintenance Agreement; waivers from all neighbors and public buildings within 600 feet of the
wellhead, minimum bonding and insurance standards, and a panoply of operational and
technical requirements. Pennsylvania allows counties to impose unconventional gas well fees
on shale gas development and allows municipalities to impose the fee if a county fails to do
SO.3s Act 13 in Pennsylvania also contains a provision that sharply limits the ability of
municipalities to use their land use authority to restrict shale gas development. Pennsylvania's
Commonwealth Court struck down this provision of Act 13 on July 27, 2012, and at the time of
writing, Governor Corbett's administration was expected to appeal to the state Supreme
Court.36 As a third example, New York, which has had a long-running moratorium on shale gas
development, may release a plan in which local communities in five counties abutting
Pennsylvania will be given an opportunity to decide whether they want to allow shale gas
development to occur in their towns.
Calls for Federal Regulation
Accompanying the recent boom in shale gas production and its spread to parts of the country,
such as Pennsylvania, that have not experienced significant amounts of drilling in recent
decades, have been calls for the federal government to step in and take a more forceful
regulatory role. These calls have come from various parties, generally based on the premise
that federal regulation would provide stronger protections for public health and safety and for
the environment than state-directed regulation.
For example, some journalists and media outlets have argued that state enforcement of their
own regulations and of federal regulations over which they have primacy are inadequate. A
report in the New York Times expressed concern that state regulators in Pennsylvania were not
adequately enforcing regulations controlling the types and levels of contaminants that can be
sent to wastewater treatment plants. In particular, the article cited government and industry
documents as well as interviews with state environmental officials stating that drilling
3 City of Fort Worth, Ordinance No. 18449-02-2009; Rahm, "Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing in Shale Gas
Plays"; Riley, "Wrangling with Urban Wildcatters."
3s Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, "Act 13 of 2012."
36 Sarah Hoye, "Pennsylvania Court Strikes down Key Part of Law Limiting Local Control of Fracking -
CNN.com."
3 Hakim, "Hydrofracking Under Cuomo Plan Would Be Restricted to a Few Counties."
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operators were taking water contaminated with radioactive materials to wastewater treatment
facilities that were not equipped to remove these contaminants and that the contaminated
water was being released into the state's rivers.38
Some scholars have suggested that the current system may inadequately protect human health
and the environment, and that the federal government should set a minimum regulatory floor
following the doctrine of "cooperative federalism." Wiseman articulates a variety of arguments
for a stronger federal role, including scenarios in which states do not strengthen their own
regulations to better deal with the risks presented by shale gas development or if those risks
are found to be particularly significant.39 Wiseman also suggests that the current pattern of
significantly disparate standards and strategies for environmental and health protection among
the states could be evidence for the existence of a "race to the bottom" in which states are
competing to loosen regulation to attract drilling.4 0 She raises the possibility of, "developing a
federal regulatory floor to ensure minimum standards of environmental and human health
protection - whether under the Safe Drinking Water Act to address concerns about the quality
of underground sources of drinking water, under RCRA, or a new federal act...."4 1 Similarly,
Freeman asserts that the current patchwork of state regulations is inadequate to protect public
safety, health, and environmental wellbeing because some states have regulations that are
insufficiently rigorous while others do not have sufficient experience and resources to enforce
their standards.42 Freeman also calls for a federal regulatory floor that would require a defined
minimum level of public health and environmental protection in all states, but would allow
states to set higher standards if they so desire.4 3
Thesis Question, Outline, and Summary of Findings
The current regulatory structure for shale gas development places the bulk of regulatory
responsibility squarely on the states. States regulate the shale gas development process from
start to finish and have developed an extensive body of regulations to control various aspects of
site location, drilling, fracturing, disposal, and handling of waste products. States put these
written regulations into effect by inspecting well sites, noting violations, requiring that
operators bring operations into compliance, and, in some cases, taking enforcement actions
such as issuing administrative orders, entering into consent orders, and imposing penalties.
38 Urbina, "Regulation Lax as Gas Wells' Tainted Water Hits Rivers."
39 Wiseman, "Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia," 285-286; Hannah Wiseman, "Questions
Re: Shale Gas Regulation (personal Correspondence with Author)."
40 Wiseman, "Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia," 289-290.
41 Ibid., 287.
42 Freeman, "The Wise Way to Regulate Hydraulic Fracturing."
43 Ibid.
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The federal government and municipalities and counties (and in some limited cases, regional
authorities such as the Delaware River Basin Commission) also regulate aspects of shale gas
development. Yet, even in these situations, the states have significant roles to play. Most
states have gained primacy to apply and enforce the federal Clean Water Act, Safe Drinking
Water Act, and Clean Air Act. In addition, states define how much regulatory authority to
delegate to municipalities and counties and while some, such as Texas and New York, seem to
allow for a significant degree of local decision-making, most states retain most regulatory
authority in the state capitol.
In this context, scholars, journalists, policy-makers, and members of the public have questioned
the adequacy of state regulation of shale gas development. Many commentators have claimed
that state governments are insufficiently protecting public health and safety or are insufficiently
protecting the environment. Some have called on the federal government to step in and
assume a stronger regulatory role. Wiseman and Freeman have both suggested that the
federal government could, or should, create comprehensive federal regulations for shale gas
development grounded in the idea of cooperative federalism in which all states would have to
meet and enforce a federal baseline standard, but would then be allowed to exceed that
standard. As Freeman notes, the federal government has taken action of this sort before. She
draws a parallel to the enactment of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA)
of 1977.44 Congress enacted the SMCRA because the existing state laws that regulated surface
coal mining were deemed to be inadequate at preventing severe environmental degradation.45
Congressman Udall, a primary force behind the passage of the bill, wrote that:
[Congress] found that the legitimate and irresistible urge on the part of a state to
protect its coal industry from competitive disadvantage, vis-h-vis coal producers in other
states, usually overwhelmed most state legislatures' desire to impose sound
reclamation laws. Well motivated people on the state level did what they could, but
without federal standards political reality militates in favor of loose controls. 46
Does a similar imperative face regulators of shale gas production today?
This thesis seeks to answer the question: Given the state of regulation of shale gas
development, should the federal government seize primary regulatory authority, leave primary
regulatory authority with the states, or take some other set of actions to improve regulatory
outcomes?
44 ibid.
4s Morris K. Udall, "Enactment of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 in
Retrospect," 553-555.
46 ibid., 553.
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I seek to answer this question by analyzing the current practice of shale gas regulation at the
federal and, particularly, at the state level and by applying what we know about regulatory
federalism, especially as it relates to environmental regulation, to the regulation of shale gas
development.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of federal regulation of shale gas development. This survey of
federal legislation as it applies to shale gas development finds that there is no federal
legislation aimed specifically at the regulation of shale gas development, or even at oil and
natural gas development more generally. Instead, a number of environmental laws concerning
water, air, hazardous materials, and protected animal species apply to numerous aspects of
shale gas development. Critically, however, Congress has carved out various exemptions over
the years for oil and gas development and, in 2005, for hydraulic fracturing, thereby limiting the
reach and applicability of all of these federal laws. In addition, most states have gained primacy
status with regard to enforcing federal regulations under three key laws that apply to shale gas
development: the Clean Water Act, and Clean Air Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act.
My survey of federal regulation is followed by a review of state regulation of shale gas
development in Chapter 3. I look at applicable regulations in a sample of seven states active in
shale gas development in different parts of the country (or, in the case of New York State, likely
soon to be active), with different histories of oil and gas development, diverse geological and
environmental conditions, and varying attitudes toward the appropriate role of government in
regulating economic activity. As of 2010, these seven states constituted 95 percent of shale gas
production in the United States. Chapter 3 is organized around the stages involved in digging a
natural gas well and developing shale gas, tracing how states regulate shale gas development
from the initial hunt for a drilling site up to final disposal of waste products. I find that most
states have at least some sort of regulation on the books for most steps in shale gas
development. The purpose of the regulations, however, varies greatly, with some prioritizing
the protection of physical structures, some attaching greater importance to the safety of public
water supplies, some protecting sensitive habitat areas. In addition, states employ varying
strategies: some states have prescriptive regulations, some use measurable performance
standards, and some rely only on narrative-based descriptions of the intended purpose of
regulation. All the states reviewed have responded to the shale gas rush by updating their
regulations, although in some states this has only covered disclosure requirements (e.g. Texas)
while in Pennsylvania the entire regulatory framework governing drilling was overhauled in
early 2012. There is very significant diversity among the states regarding regulation of many
aspects of shale gas development, but all seven of the states do regulate almost all aspects of
the development process.
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Regulations, as written, tell only part of the story; to see the whole picture, it is necessary to
look at how regulations are applied and enforced. Chapter 4 reviews regulatory enforcement
data to understand how state regulators interpret the law and apply the enforcement tools at
their disposal for purposes of protecting public health, safety, and environmental quality. The
data that are available are limited. Nevertheless, the composite picture that begins to emerge
is that most state regulatory agencies are struggling to catch up with the drilling and production
boom, and this is occurring in an era of fiscal austerity and lean government budgets. The types
of violations that are detected, as reflected in state records, very from state to state and most
would be observable from a visual site inspection or a review of paperwork (as opposed to
regulatory violations that occur underground or involve air emissions, which are more difficult
to observe). Most states employ what might be called a "cooperative regulatory model" in
which regulators work closely with shale gas operators to bring them into compliance with the
law. Most violations initially receive no formal sanction; instead, operators are given a chance
to remedy the violation and bring their operation into compliance without incurring any sort of
penalty. In most states, a very small percentage of recorded violations receive a fine or involve
some other enforcement action beyond a basic citation of noncompliance. Regulatory
authorities are far more likely to issue a fine for violations of permitting and reporting
requirements than for spills or blowouts - events that present a more immediate threat to
public safety and health and to environmental quality.
Chapter 5 offers an argument for why primary regulatory authority should remain with the
states, as opposed to being shifted to the federal level. My argument is grounded in the theory
of regulatory federalism, particularly as it usually applies to environmental regulation.
Regulatory federalism seeks to assign the appropriate level of government for the exercise of
particular regulatory authority, including the creation, application, and enforcement of
regulations. I interpret regulatory federalism in terms of criteria that can used to evaluate
whether the states or the federal government is best suited to oversee a given economic
activity from a public interest perspective. Chapter 5 employs two types of criteria, which will
be described here in turn. The first set of criteria are "level-neutral" and seek to ascertain
whether the federal government or the states might be better suited to regulate shale gas
development. These four primary criteria are: geographic distribution of costs and benefits;
regulatory capacity; innovation, flexibility, and adaptability; and efficiency, certainty, and
stability. I use a second set of criteria to diagnose whether, not withstanding the findings of the
first set, regulatory failure is occurring often enough that the states (which hold primary
regulatory responsibility over shale gas development) appear not to be handling their
regulatory responsibilities adequately (in which case the federal government should assume
greater regulatory responsibility). These second type of criteria follows from two questions: "Is
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competition among the states to attract limited capital investment causing downward pressure
on state regulations? (often known as a "race to the bottom")," and "Is regulatory capture by
industry players occurring in state capitals or state agencies?" If the answer to either of these
questions is yes, even in a subset of states, there would be a strong case that regulatory failure
is occurring at the state level, and that further federal intervention and, likely, federal
assumption of regulatory authority is required.
The analytical findings in Chapter 5 are summarized here:
e Most of the costs and benefits of shale gas development are experienced within the
geographic boundaries of the state where the development is occurring. Furthermore,
the practice of shale gas development varies by geography, due in part to geological and
environmental factors. As a result, states appear to be best suited to regulate most
aspects of shale gas development since they are in the best position to decide how to
strike a balance between the costs and benefits of shale gas development as
experienced by their own residents. The exception to this finding arises when
externalities cross state borders, as occurs with air emissions, contamination of
navigable waterways, and earthquakes resulting from underground injection of
wastewater - all of which are already regulated under the federal Clean Air Act, Clean
Water Act, and Safe Drinking Water Act, respectively.
e Both the federal government and the states possess the requisite technical know-how
to regulate shale gas development. The states, however, have greater experience
regulating oil and gas development than the federal government does (although the
federal government does have experience regulating off-shore drilling). The states are
also better positioned to understand the unique geological, environmental, and land use
factors that impact how shale gas development and its regulation are likely to play out
in specific locations. The states edge out the federal government in possessing superior
regulatory capacity.
e A virtue of a federal system is that states can experiment with different ways of doing
things before the country adopts a single federal standards or method. States are
engaging in this type of experimentation in their regulation of shale gas development.
States are responding differently to the risks presented by shale gas development and
are adopting a variety of strategies to mitigate these risks. States, and even the federal
government, are learning from the experiences of other jurisdictions and are seeking to
apply lessons and best practices from other states as they emerge. Therefore, the
states appear to be better positioned to pursue regulatory innovation than is the federal
government. The states are also in a better position to respond flexibly to the
circumstances of the localities where shale gas development is occurring because they
have a richer understanding of local conditions.
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* States have been at the forefront of efforts to use economic incentives and
performance standards to make environmental regulations more economically efficient.
A similar trend can be observed in state regulation of shale gas development. An
argument can also be made that states are more likely to provide regulatory stability
and certainty because state regulatory agencies are arguably under less pressure from
national interest groups and under less public scrutiny than federal regulatory agencies.
State regulation can achieve greater regulatory efficiency and stability than can federal
regulation.
e The nature of the shale gas industry belies the claim that there is a "race to the
(regulatory) bottom" occurring. Decisions about where to drill appear to be driven
more by a calculation of whether a particular well in a particular gas field will be
profitable, with the cost side of the profit equation composed of varying geology,
environment, land, infrastructure, and labor costs in addition to the regulatory costs and
taxes imposed by the states. In addition, a number of states have been strengthening
regulations in recent months, not weakening them. There does not appear to be a state
regulatory failure that the federal government has to remedy.
e Finally, the answer to the question of whether state regulatory agencies have been
"captured" by the oil and gas industry is unknown. On the one hand, the states have
regulations in place. In some places these regulations are "stronger" than in others, and
states are adapting and updating their regulations to address emerging risks associated
with shale gas development. On the other hand, state regulators work cooperatively
with the industry, and their enforcement practices appear to be more focused on
encouraging compliance when a violation is found than with incentivizing the industry
by meting out punishments. There are many possible reasons that could explain states'
enforcement practices, including a policy choice to favor the benefits of shale gas
development over benefits that could be derived from greater regulation. Without a
clearer understanding that regulatory capture has occurred, it would be premature for
the federal government to usurp state regulatory authority at this time.
In Chapter Five I conclude that primary regulatory authority over shale gas development is best
left with the states. They are better positioned to regulate most aspects of shale gas
development, save for a few areas in which the federal government already exercises primary
regulatory authority.
Finally, Chapter 6 offers policy recommendations regarding steps that both the federal
government and state governments could take to improve the effectiveness of shale gas
regulation. States could use revenues derived from taxes and fees derived from oil and gas
development to hire more inspection and enforcement personnel. They should consider
shifting liability from the public, where it now rests, to shale gas operators, thereby
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incentivizing them to take greater responsibility for potential negative externalities caused by
their operations. The federal government could invest in greater research, technical assistance,
and disclosure and strengthen enforcement of existing federal laws that already regulate
interstate environmental and health effects.
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Chapter 2 - Federal Regulations
Introduction
Regulation of oil and gas operations was first enacted at the state level, as will be described in
Chapter 3. With the emergence of the environmental movement in the 1960s and 1970s in the
United States, however, the federal government enacted a number of laws that apply to oil and
gas extraction and development and, specifically, to shale gas development. Federal laws that
apply to aspects of the shale gas development process include the Clean Water Act; and Clean
Air Act; the Safe Drinking Water Act; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act; the Endangered Species Act; the Migratory Birds Treaty Act; the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act; and the Occupational Safety and Health Act. In
addition, shale gas development that takes place on federal lands is subject to regulations
promulgated by the Bureau of Land Management. It is important to note, however, that a
number of exemptions have been carved out of these laws for oil and gas development and
specifically for hydraulic fracturing, both by Congress and the Environmental Protection Agency,
that sharply limit the exercise of federal regulatory authority over shale gas development.
This chapter will review the federal government's regulatory authority over shale gas
development, noting what authority the federal government does, and does not, exercise.4 7 In
addition, this chapter will note instances in which federal authority is actually delegated to, and
exercised by, the states. Finally, the chapter will document current activity at the federal level
that could potentially lead to further action, whether regulatory or otherwise, at the federal
level in the future.
4 This documentation of federal regulations pertaining to shale gas extraction draws on an analysis
performed by Hannah Wiseman and Francis Gradijan in their white paper: "Regulation of Shale Gas
Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing." The white paper is part of a larger series published by
the Energy Institute at the University of Texas at Austin titled Fact-Based Regulation for Environmental
Protection in Shale Gas Development. The University of Texas study has come under scrutiny due to
undisclosed financial ties between the study's Principal Investigator, Charles G. Groat, and an oil and gas
company engaged shale gas development, Plains Exploration and Production. While this undisclosed
financial relationship has come under scrutiny, the findings reviewing federal and state regulations and
enforcement efforts by the states have not been called into question by most observers. In addition, a
conversation by this author with Hannah Wiseman, the author of the relevant chapters in the University
of Texas report, revealed that Wiseman was unaware of Groat's interest in Plains Exploration and
Production. For a discussion of issues relating to conflict of interests in academia focused on shale gas
development, including the University of Texas study, please see: Revkin, "A Deeper Look at Undisclosed
Conflicts of Interest in 'Frackademia'."
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Federal Statutes that Apply to Shale Gas Development
There are a number of federal environmental and public safety laws that apply to the process of
shale gas development. These laws, and how they apply to shale gas development, are
reviewed here.
Clean Water Act
Some aspects of the Clean Water Act apply to shale gas development (and, more generally, oil
and gas development). For example, the Act has provisions mandating the management of
stormwater runoff during the construction and operation of oil and gas wells. 48 Congress has
created an exemption from this regulation, which will be described further below. In addition,
the Act requires that operators obtain a permit before discharging any pollutant into U.S.
waters.4 9
Congress has exempted certain aspects of oil and gas development from Clean Water Act
protections. Generally, the Clean Water Act requires that industrial facilities secure a
stormwater permit for both construction of the facility (during which soil sediment can run off
the construction site) and ongoing operation of the facility (during which pollutants can be
carried off the site with stormwater. An exemption exists for "discharges of stormwater runoff
from mining operations or oil and gas exploration, production, processing, or treatment
operations or transmission facilities" when the stormwater runoff is "composed entirely of
flows which are from conveyances or systems of conveyances (including but not limited to
pipes, conduits, ditches, and channels) used for collecting and conveying precipitation runoff"
and which are not contaminated due to contact with the actual products of oil and gas
extraction.50 In other words, the Act exempts operators from needing to secure a permit for
runoff that only comes into contact with pipes and other structures intended solely to handle
the runoff and is not polluted by contact with any other industrial substances.
In addition, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 that was enacted by Congress expanded the
definition of oil and gas exploration and production activities under the Clean Water Act.51
Following this definitional change, the Environmental Protection Agency revised its regulations
under the Clean Water Act to exempt oil and gas construction activities from stormwater
permitting requirements, but a subsequent lawsuit reversed this regulatory change. 2 As a
result, the EPA has essentially reverted to the regulations for stormwater as they existed prior
to the 2005 Energy Policy Act, in which oil and gas operators are required to secure a
48 33 U.S.C. § 402(l).
49 33 U.S.C. § 1311; 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
so 33 U.S.C. § 402(l)(2).
51 33 U.S.C. § 1362(24).
52 EPA, "Regulation of Oil and Gas Construction Activities."
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stormwater permit for construction and operation of a well pad and access road that is one
acre or larger in size.s3
To summarize, the Clean Water Act applies to shale gas development through two key
mechanisms. The first is that operators must secure stormwater permits for both the
construction and operation of well pads and access roads of a certain minimum size. As will be
described in greater detail in Chapter 3, the permits require operators to submit a storm water
pollution prevention plan that serve to control the sedimentation of waterways near well pads
and limit the quantity of pollutants, such as diesel and other chemicals, that would enter
waterways due to leakage from equipment and general industrial activity.54 Since soil sediment
counts as "contaminated runoff" under EPA regulation, and since most sites in the current
phase of shale gas development are larger than one acre, these stormwater regulations apply
to most sites. The second key control that the Clean Water Act and its associated regulations
impose on shale gas development is to prohibit the discharge of pollutants into water bodies
without a permit. The primary impact of this regulation is on the disposal of wastes from
drilling and fracturing operations. Operators are prohibited from discharging wastes in such a
way that contaminants from the disposal would adversely impact surface water bodies without
obtaining a permit under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
program.55 This effectively prohibits the direct dumping of wastes into surface waters and
encompasses regulation of publicly owned treatment works (POTWs), thereby regulating the
qualities of wastewater that operators can dispose of through these facilities.
Safe Drinking Water Act
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) was initially passed in 1974 to regulate public drinking
water supplies but amendments in 1996 significantly enhanced the law's protections for water
sources. A key mechanism employed by SDWA to protect underground drinking water
supplies is requiring entities that inject substances underground to prevent contamination of
groundwater sources.57 The Environmental Protection Agency had long maintained that
hydraulic fracturing was not included in the definition of "underground injection," a position
that was successfully challenged in a court case filed in 1994 by the Legal Environmental
Assistance Foundation. 8 In the 2005 Energy Policy Act, however, Congress amended the Safe
Drinking Water Act to reinforce the EPA's traditional non-inclusion of hydraulic fracturing as a
form of underground injection with the following language: "The term 'underground
s3 Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 26.
s4 Ibid., 35.
ss US EPA, "NPDES Permitting Program."
56 US EPA, "Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)."
s7 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1)(B).
58S. Marvin Rogers, History of Litigation Concerning Hydraulic Fracturing to Produce Coalbed Methane.
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injection'... excludes... the underground injection of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel
fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production
activities."' 59 As can be seen from this this text, however, Congress kept hydraulic fracturing
using diesel fuels under the purview of the Safe Drinking Water Act. The EPA is currently
undergoing the public review process for draft guidance that it has released on the use of diesel
in hydraulic fracturing.60 Aside from hydraulic fracturing, the Safe Drinking Water Act does
have jurisdiction over the injection of waste substances that are disposed of in underground
injection control wells, which is the most common method of disposal, particularly of liquid
wastes from shale gas extraction operations. 61
To summarize, the Safe Drinking Water Act currently regulates two aspects of shale gas
development: hydraulic fracturing only when dieselfuels are used, and disposal of wastes in
underground injection control wells.
Clean Air Act
Until recently, the Clean Air Act has exercised minimal control over oil and gas drilling as most
wells were categorized as "minor source" sites of emissions while the Clean Air Act focuses on
limiting harmful emissions from "major source" sites of emissions. There are a number of
recent changes in how the EPA is conceiving of its regulatory mandate in relation to air
emissions from oil and gas sites, including hydraulic fracturing, that are changing how the
agency enforces the Clean Air Act.
In September of 2009, an EPA official circulated a memorandum to the agency's Regional
Administrators withdrawing the agency's standing guidance on source determinations for the
oil and gas industry and encouraging EPA staff to:
...rely foremost on the three regulatory criteria for identifying emissions activities that
belong to the same "building," "structure," "facility," or "installation." These are (1)
whether the activities are under the control of the same person (or person under
common control); (2) whether the activities are located on one or more contiguous or
adjacent properties; and (3) whether the activities belong to the same industrial
grouping.62
59 Pub. L. No. 109-58 § 322.
60 US EPA, "Permitting Guidance for Oil and Gas Hydraulic Fracturing Activities Using Diesel Fuels - Draft:
Underground Injection Control Program Guidance #84."
6 42 U.S.C. § 300h (d)(1) (2011).
62 "Memorandum from Gina McCarthy, Assistant Administrator to Regional Administrators, Withdrawal
of Source Determinations for Oil and Gas Industries."
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This methodology could bring many more oil and gas sites, including shale gas sites, under
purview of the Clean Air Act's "major source" regulations.6 In addition, the EPA released new
rules on April 17, 2012 that require shale gas operators to control emissions of volatile organic
compounds (VOCs) resulting from flowback by using "green completions."64 Gas compressor
stations, whether newly built or those that increase their hourly emissions due to modification,
are also subject to emissions controls for "Stationary Spark Ignition Internal Combustion
Engines."6s
To summarize, while the EPA has taken steps to expand regulation and controls over air
emissions from shale gas development sites in recent years, including requiring green
completions to limit VOC emissions, most emissions from the shale gas industry are not
currently regulated. The EPA does seem to be taking steps to enhance regulation of air
emissions, though, including of methane as a greenhouse gas.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 governs disposal of solid wastes
and hazardous wastes. As explained by EPA, RCRA was designed to take a comprehensive
approach to control of hazardous wastes: "The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
gives EPA the authority to control hazardous waste from the "cradle-to-grave." This includes
the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste."66
When RCRA was first enacted, the law was written to cover wastes resulting from the oil and
gas development process. In 1980, however, Congress granted a temporary exemption to
"exploration and production" oil and gas wastes and directed the EPA to study whether these
wastes should be regulated under Subtitle C of RCRA.68 The EPA, in the late 1980s, determined
that regulation of oil and gas wastes as hazardous wastes was "unwarranted" due to both the
significant costs that would be imposed on oil and gas producers under Subtitle C regulation
and the fact that state regulation of oil and gas wastes was generally adequate.
A significant aspect of the EPA's findings, particularly for purposes of this paper, is that the
agency did recognize that some oil and gas exploration and production wastes are hazardous
63 Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 74.
64 US EPA, "Oil and Natural Gas Air Pollution Standards."
65 40 CFR Part 63, Subpart ZZZZ.
66 US EPA, "Summary of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act."
67 James R. Cox, "Revisiting RCRA's Oilfield Waste Exemption as to Certain Hazardous Oilield Exploration
and Production Wastes," 2.
68 Ibid., 3; 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(B).
69 Wiseman, "Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia," 245-246.
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and also found state regulations to be lacking in some respects with regards to oil and gas
waste handling.70 As the EPA decided not to regulate these wastes itself, however, it provided
funding to the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC) to review state regulations,
and the IOGCC formed an organization called the State Review of Oil & Natural Gas
Environmental Regulations, Inc., or "STRONGER." 7 1 STRONGER is a nonprofit, multi-stakeholder
organization, composed of representatives of industry, environmental groups, and regulatory
officials, that has developed guidelines for state regulations around waste handling and
disposal and groundwater protection. States can voluntarily submit their own regulatory
programs for review to STRONGER and can then whether to implement the recommendations
produced through the review process.7 3
To summarize, wastes resulting from the oil and gas production processes, including shale gas
production, are exempt from federal regulation under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980
was designed to clean up sites contaminated with hazardous substances. It principally effects
current and ongoing shale gas operations due to operators' reporting responsibilities for
releases of hazardous chemicals of threshold quantities. 75 Operators may be liable for cleanup
and remediation costs resulting from these releases.
Congress exempted oil and natural gas, and the chemicals contained in these substances, from
CERCLA reporting and liability provisions. The EPA notes that, in addition to petroleum and oil,
the "definition of hazardous substance also excludes natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied
natural gas, and synthetic gas usable for fuel."77 Shale gas operators are still responsible for
reporting, and may be liable for, spills of other hazardous substances used in the shale gas
production process, including the chemicals used in fracturing fluids.
To summarize, shale gas operators are exempt from reporting and from potential liability for
spills and contamination caused solely from natural gas and petroleum (which, in the case, of
70 ibid., 246-248.
71 STRONGER, Inc., "Formation of STRONGER."
72 STRONGER, Inc., "Who We Are."
73 STRONGER, Inc., "State Reviews - The Process."
7 US EPA, "CERCLA Overview."
7s 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2011).
76 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2011).
7 US EPA, "Superfund - Reportable Quantities."
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gas, is anyways airborne), but are not exempt from reporting of spills of the various other
hazardous materials that are used in the extraction process and are covered by CERCLA.
Reporting of Chemicals
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) and the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) require operators to maintain material safety data sheets
(MSDS) for certain chemicals that are stored at the drilling site above threshold quantities. 8
Under EPCRA, however, oil and gas operators are not required to prepare annual toxic chemical
release forms, as the oil and gas industry is not one of the listed industries under the Act.7 In
addition, although EPCRA requires that operators must provide the MSDS to local emergency
planning committees upon request, it allows operators to claim that certain chemical
compositions are "trade secrets" and are therefore exempt from disclosure.8 0
Federal Wildlife Protections
Shale gas operators are required to comply with the provisions of both the Endangered Species
Act and the Migratory Birds Treaty Act. Under the Endangered Species Act, operators are
required to confer with the Fish and Wildlife Service about potential harm to listed species and
must secure an incidental "take" permit if well development is likely to adversely impact
endangered to threatened species.81 Under the Migratory Birds Treaty Act, shale gas operators
are held liable for any harm to protected species and therefore must ensure that gas
development facilities, such as surface pits and drilling rigs, do not attract and harm members
of protected species.82
State Primacy
As explored in the above review, federal laws, and rules and regulations promulgated by EPA
and other federal agencies pursuant to federal laws, cover some, but not all, aspects of shale
gas development. It is worth noting that, of the federal laws and regulations that apply to shale
gas, many are actually administered and enforced by states.
For example, the Safe Drinking Water Act gives states and Native American tribes primary
enforcement responsibility (known as "primacy") if they can meet certain requirements.83
Although the contours of primacy vary somewhat between the different laws covered here, the
78 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(b) (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 11005 (2011).
79 Wiseman, "Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia," note 125.
80 Ibid.
81 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (a) (2011).
82 16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 707 (2011).
83 See US EPA, "Safe Drinking Water Act - Primacy." States must meet a dozen requirements to receive
primacy under the Safe Drinking Water Act.
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basic idea is that, once a state has been granted primacy it replaces the federal government in
the various components of administering the law and its regulations. For example, in states
that have primacy under the Clean Water Act, operators must apply to the state, not the
federal government, for stormwater permitting and these states also take enforcement action
in case of non-compliance. The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES),
under which stormwater permitting is done, has five categories under which states and
territories can receive primacy approval, including "State NPDES Permit Program," "Regulate
Federal Facilities," and "State Pretreatment Program."3 4 All states, save for four, have obtained
primacy under NPDES in most of the five categories.s Under state primacy, the federal
Environmental Protection Agency exercises some degree of guidance and oversight over state
administration of federal law, and can direct states to reexamine their application and
enforcement of federal law, going so far as to revoke state primacy.86 In the realm of shale gas
regulation, the EPA critically questioned Pennsylvania's enforcement of the Clean Water Act
with regards to shale gas operators who were taking flowback water and produced water to
publicly owned treatment works (wastewater treatment plants) for disposal.87 The
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection consequently requested that operators
no longer take their wastes to publicly owned treatment works for disposal.
Of the federal laws reviewed here, many states have gained primacy in administration of the
Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act.
Future Directions
The Environmental Protection Agency, in some cases under direction from Congress, is
currently exploring the possibility of expanding the ambit of federal regulatory authority over
select aspects of shale gas development.
Clean Water Act: The EPA is updating chloride water quality criteria which will provide an
updated scientific basis on which to issue discharge permits. This will impact the handling of
flowback and produced water by publicly owned treatment works. The EPA expects to release
draft criteria in early 2013.89 In addition, the EPA has initiated a rule-making process to create a
pretreatment standard for wastewater from shale gas operations before the wastewater can be
84 IUS EPA, "National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)."
85 Ibid.
86 Spence, "Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production," note 159.
8 Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 127.
88 ibid.
89 US EPA, Office of External Affairs, "Natural Gas Extraction - Hydraulic Fracturing."
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treated in publicly owned treatment works (POTWs). These regulations would take effect
under the Clean Water Act and the EPA expects to propose rules by 2014.90
Safe Drinking Water Act: The EPA released draft guidance on the use of diesel fuels in hydraulic
fracturing in May 2012.91 At the time of writing, the draft guidance was open to public
comment.9 2
Clean Air Act: As noted above, the EPA revised its guidelines for source determination in 2009.
The impact of this revision is still playing out and could bring many more oil and gas sites,
including shale gas sites, under purview of the Clean Air Act's "major source" regulations. 93
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act: Although wastes generated during the exploration,
development, and production of crude oil, natural gas, and geothermal energy are exempt from
federal hazardous waste regulations the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the EPA is
"currently evaluating industry practices and state requirements and is considering the need for
technical guidance on the design, operation, maintenance, and closure of pits under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in order to minimize potential environmental
impacts."9 4
Bureau of Land Management Regulations: In addition to the laws and attendant regulations
described above, it should be noted that the federal government does directly regulate drilling
and fracturing on federally-owned land, which is overseen by the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM). The BLM released draft rules for hydraulic fracturing in early May of 2012.9s At the time
of writing, the draft rules have undergone public comment and are expected to be finalized by
the end of the year. The three key components of this draft revision are: public disclosure of
hydraulic fracturing chemicals, new guidelines for casing wells and conducting integrity-testing,
and required submission of water management plans. 96 Although the BLM regulations only
apply to drilling on federal lands (which is quite extensive), the regulations may have the effect
90 US EPA, "Shale Gas Extraction."
91 US EPA, "Permitting Guidance for Oil and Gas Hydraulic Fracturing Activities Using Diesel Fuels - Draft:
Underground Injection Control Program Guidance #84."
92 US EPA, "Draft Guidance: Permitting Guidance for Oil and Gas Hydraulic Fracturing Activities Using
Diesel Fuels."
93 Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 74.
94 US EPA, Office of External Affairs, "Natural Gas Extraction - Hydraulic Fracturing."
95 Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgt., "Press Release: Interior Releases Draft Rule Requiring
Public Disclosure of Chemicals Used in Hydraulic Fracturing on Public and Indian Lands."
96 Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgt., "43 C.F.R. Pt. 360, WO-300-L1310000.FJ0000, Proposed
Rule for Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on Federal and Indian Lands."
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of setting an effective "floor" for state regulations and encouraging states to bring their own
regulations in line with the BLM rules.
EPA Study on Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing on Drinking Water Resources: Apart
from its regulatory role, Congress directed EPA to undertake a study on potential impacts on
drinking water of hydraulic fracturing. EPA has constructed the study to "includes the full
lifespan of water in hydraulic fracturing, from acquisition of the water, through the mixing of
chemicals and actual fracturing, to the post-fracturing stage, including the management of
flowback and produced water and its ultimate treatment and disposal."97 The EPA expects to
release a progress report in late 2012 and the full report for public comment and peer review in
2014.98
Conclusion
Congress passed an array of environmental legislation in the 1970s and into the early 1980s,
many of touch on an aspect of shale gas development one way or another. Over the years,
however, Congress has carved out exemptions from this legislation for oil and gas development
and, more recently, specifically for hydraulic fracturing, thereby significantly limiting the reach
of federal regulation over shale gas development. In addition, most states have gained primacy
status to apply and enforce federal regulations under three key laws that apply to shale gas
development: the Clean Water Act, and Clean Air Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act. Both
the Environmental Protection Agency and the Bureau of Land Management are in various
stages of conducting research, enacting new rules, and clarifying existing rules to respond to
the risks presented by shale gas development.
97 US EPA, "EPA's Study of Hydraulic Fracturing and Its Potential Impact on Drinking Water Resources."
98 ibid.
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Chapter 3 - State Regulations
Introduction
Regulation of drilling for oil and natural gas first emerged in the late 1800s and early 1900s in
states, and in some cities, that were active in extraction at that time. New York enacted
regulations requiring operators to plug abandoned wells in 1879 and various states, including
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, and California adopted regulations for casing and plugging wells
in subsequent years.99 Intriguingly, a history of oil and gas regulation written by the Ground
Water Protection Council notes that:
Most of these early regulations on well construction and plugging were not specifically
designed to protect ground and surface water from the impacts of oil and natural gas
production.... In these early years the principal focus was on protection of the petroleum
resource from the effects of water incursion and not on protection of water resources
themselves.100
The 1930s saw the beginning of oil (gas was a very secondary concern at the time) conservation
efforts. 01 In contrast to common use of the word "conservation" today, these regulations
strived to "promote conservation of oil resources through an orderly development of oil
reservoirs."10 2 In other words, the goal was to maximize oil production and minimize the
amount of oil left in the ground. A number of oil producing states created "conservation
commissions" or "corporation commissions" during this era to oversee exploration and
production, such as the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission, and the Texas Railroad Commission (which was given authority over
oil and gas along with its initial mandate over railroads). Generally beginning in the 1940s,
state regulations began protecting against certain risks to public health and environmental
damage, such as regulations on surface pits and requirements that operators clean up serious
oil spills in surface waters.10 3 In line with the passage of federal environmental regulations
described in Chapter 2, state regulations expanded to protect environmental resources and
public health in the 1960s and 1970s.104
99 Ground Water Protection Council, State Oil and Natural Gas Regulations Designed to Protect Water
Resources, 13.
100 Ibid., 12.
1 The Ground Water Protection Council history does note that the Interstate Oil Compact Commission
did develop "model" gas regulations (that states could choose to emulate) in the early 1960s, similar to
model oil regulations developed in 1935. See: Ibid., 13.
102 ibid.
103 ibid., 14.
104 ibid., 14-15.
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Today, many of the states that established specific agencies (such as conservation commissions)
to oversee and promote oil and gas development have left primary or exclusive regulatory
responsibility in the hands of that same agency.05 These agencies had already been regulating
the industry for many years and had technical expertise in areas such as well spacing and casing
requirements.106 As a result, in some states (such as Colorado), these conservation
commissions also enforce environmental protections pertaining to oil and gas production.
Some states have given primary regulatory authority to an environmental agency, such as
Pennsylvania has with the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. And some
states, such as Texas, take a hybrid approach, with the Railroad Commission exercising the bulk
of regulatory authority but with the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality holding
responsibility for administering air quality regulations. 10 7
This chapter describes the diverse regulatory approaches that have been taken by a sample of
states in which shale gas extraction is currently active or, in the case of New York State, has
been heavily debated and may begin soon. The states covered in this review are: Arkansas,
Colorado, Louisiana, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas. These states represent
some of the most active shale gas extraction areas across the United States, including the
Barnett Shale (Texas), Fayetteville Shale (Arkansas), Haynesville Shale (Louisiana), Marcellus
Shale (New York and Pennsylvania), Niobrara Shale (Colorado), and Woodford Shale
(Oklahoma). Production from these states accounted for 94.53 percent of shale gas production
in the United States in 2010.108
These states also represent a cross-section of histories of oil and gas extraction, political
climates, and regulatory approaches. Although the first oil well was drilled in Titusville, PA in
1859, in recent decades oil and gas drilling has been much more common in states such as
Texas and Oklahoma.109 With refinements in drilling technology that were first pioneered in
Texas' Barnett Shale, however, the Marcellus formation underlying Pennsylvania and New York
has become very attractive to drilling operators - it is the largest unconventional gas field in the
10s Wiseman, "Fracturing Regulation Applied," 370.
106 Mike Soraghan, "Oil and Gas: Protecting Oil from Water -- the History of State Regulation."
Wiseman, "Fracturing Regulation Applied," note 49.
108 Data derived from: U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Shale Gas Production." Almost all of this
production came from Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania (listed in descending
order of production volumes). Although production in Colorado from the Niobrara Shale was minimal in
2010 and New York produced no shale gas due to its ongoing moratorium, these two states were
included in this survey due to the innovative nature of their regulations.
109 Ground Water Protection Council, State Oil and Natural Gas Regulations Designed to Protect Water
Resources, 8.
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United States and the second largest unconventional gas field in the world." The states also
represent a variety of political climates that are variously more or less inclined to the role of
government vis-s-vis industry and environmental protections.
The states, as will be seen through the review, also represent a diversity of approaches to
regulation of the oil and gas industry. Texas, for example, has a very active oil and gas industry
and has traditionally employed a minimalist regulatory style with regards to oil and gas
extraction."' Colorado updated many of its regulations after a wave of drilling in the early
2000s that led to an overhaul of the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. 2
Pennsylvania, after encountering a shale gas drilling boom beginning in 2008, enacted a
comprehensive update of its oil and gas laws in February 2012.13 And New York has enacted
an ongoing moratorium on shale gas drilling while it attempts to craft a policy that would allow
for shale gas development while protecting the environment and public health." 4 It should be
noted here that the regulations included in this review for New York are the draft regulations
articulated in the NYS Department of Environmental Conservation's Revised Draft Supplemental
Generic Environmental Impact Statement (Revised Draft SGEIS), which is expected to heavily
influence the shape of final regulation."s
This review of state regulation is not intended to provide a comprehensive overview of
regulation as applied to shale gas development in all states where the practice is taking place or
116is likely to occur in the future. Rather it is meant to survey the variety of regulatory
approaches that states have adopted for the purpose of comparing the nature and approach of
state regulation to federal regulation.
This chapter will survey regulations pertaining to shale gas development across seven states.
Developing a shale gas well requires multiple stages from initial testing to final well closure and
110 "Marcellus and Beyond - Natural Gas (Penn State Extension)."
i Rahm, "Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing in Shale Gas Plays."
112 Mike Soraghan, "Oil and Gas: Protecting Oil from Water -- the History of State Regulation."
113 Pa. Act 13 - Pa. H1B 1950.
114 Hakim, "Hydrofracking Under Cuomo Plan Would Be Restricted to a Few Counties."
115 N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining
Regulatory Program," Exec. Sum.-2. The Revised Draft SGEIS states that: "In reviewing and processing
permit applications... the Department would apply the requirements contained within regulations, along
with the final SGEIS and the findings drawn from it, including criteria and conditions for future
approvals" and that, "The final SGEIS will apply statewide...."
116 For a more comprehensive review of state regulations pertaining to shale gas development, see
Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing."
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site remediation, and this chapter is organized to describe applicable state regulations at most
of these stages. 117 The stages around which this review is organized are:
* Testing for gas,
* Constructing a well pad and access road,
e Locating the well pad,
* Drilling and casing a well,
* Controlling air emissions,
* Withdrawing water for hydraulic fracturing,
* Disclosure of hydraulic fracturing chemicals,
* Preventing and reporting spills,
* Testing and replacing water supplies,
* Storing wastes,
* Disposing of wastes.
Testing for Gas Procedures
The first step of drilling for natural gas in shale is to locate the productive areas of natural gas
such that production wells that are subsequently drilled will be able to successfully extract the
resource. A common method of testing involves using seismic testing techniques that
introduce energy into the ground by either detonating explosives or striking the ground with
heavy equipment.118 The reverberations resulting from these methods are measured and
interpreted to identify the presence and depth of subsurface materials including, allowing
drilling operators to locate promising locations in which to drill production wells. 19
Most states covered in this review require that operators secure a permit and/or a blaster's
license before conducting seismic testing.120 Beyond this basic requirement, state regulations
vary widely in terms of how they control activity related to testing for gas.
1 This organizational approach, as well as the documentation of regulations pertaining to shale gas
extraction, draws on an analysis performed by Hannah Wiseman and Francis Gradijan in their white
paper: "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing." The white paper is part
of a larger series published by the Energy Institute at the University of Texas at Austin titled Fact-Based
Regulation for Environmental Protection in Shale Gas Development.
N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Guidelines for Seismic Testing on DEC Administered State
Land."
119 ibid.
12 For example, Colorado requires that the operator secure a permit and Pennsylvania requires that the
operator secure a blaster's license. See 7 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1101-9:3.1 and 25 PA. CODE § 210.13.
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A number of states require that seismic activity be set back a certain distance from structures
or set other regulations to minimize damage to property. For example, Arkansas mandates that
the shot hole, into which explosives are placed, be located at least 200 feet away from
structures and further specifies that this required set-back distance could be increased based
on charge weight.' 21 Oklahoma similarly requires a 200 feet setback from structures. 22
Pennsylvania defines its required setback not be a prescribed distance but rather by a limitation
on the "maximum allowable peak particle velocity" as would be measured at the nearest
building or other structure. Pennsylvania also prohibits damage to real property due to
blasting, save for damage to the property of the blasting permittee. 4 These sorts of regulation
appears to be intended to minimize the probability of damage to buildings and other real
property, particularly those that are owned by a party other than that which is conducting the
seismic testing.
Similar to requiring setbacks from structures, a variety of states require that seismic activity be
setback from water wells. For example, both Oklahoma and Arkansas require the same 200
feet setback for water wells that they do for structures. 2 s Texas requires that operators secure
drilling permits for seismic holes that penetrate to depths at which usable groundwater "must
be protected or isolated."'2 Another type of regulation that some states have implemented in
order to protect groundwater supplies pertains to what happens to the shot hole once seismic
testing is complete. Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, and Texas all require that shot holes be
plugged at the conclusion of testing. 27 Colorado's requirements are the most detailed in this
regard, requiring that slurry, drilling fluids, and cuttings from the shot hole must be raked to
within once inch of the surface before the shot hole is plugged and filled.128 The logic behind
these requirements to plug shot holes is to prevent against the entry of contaminants deep into
the subsurface where they could leech into groundwater aquifers.129 These different types of
regulations, whether setbacks from water wells, requirements for permits when drilling into
groundwater, and requirements to plug shot holes upon completion of seismic testing, are all
designed to protect groundwater supplies.
121 AOGC, RULE B-42(k) (2011).
m 52 OKL. ST. ANN. § 318.23 (A).
123 25 PA. CODE § 211.151 (c).
1 25 PA. CODE § 211.151(a).
12s See 52 OKL. ST. ANN. § 318.23 (A) and AOGC, RULE B-42(k) (2011).
126 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.100 (a)(4), (d)(2).
27 Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 34.
128 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:333 (c)(4)(A)-(D).
129 Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 31.
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While some aspects of Louisiana's regulations mirror those of other states described here, the
state places special protections on wildlife or waterfowl refuges and on scenic river areas.
Operators are required to have a pre-project meeting and secure written permission from the
Seismic Section of the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries before commencing geophysical
exploration work. State regulations also specify that marsh buggies and other vehicles used
should minimize damage to land, water bottoms, stream bottoms, etc."30 It is noteworthy that,
in contrast to the other states reviewed, which generally locate their regulations pertaining to
seismic testing under oil and gas conservation or environmental protection agencies, Louisiana
grants regulatory jurisdiction to its Department of Wildlife and Fisheries. Louisiana, perhaps due
to the particular geography and habitats present in the bayou, places particular emphasis on
protecting wildlife habitat in its regulations.
Constructing a Well Pad and Access Road
After an operator has located a desired site for drilling extraction wells through seismic testing
and has collected the necessary extraction rights through signing mineral rights leases with
landowners, the operator must secure permits from state and/or federal agencies to construct
a well pad and access roads to the well pad.' 31 The well pad is platform, generally constructed
of either concrete or gravel, upon which production activity, including drilling, storage of
materials and wastes, etc. takes place.132 A well pad typically covers between 2.2 and 5.7 acres,
and coverage by access roads can range from very little additional coverage (if preexisting roads
are used extensively) to 2.75 acres. As a result, the footprint of well pads, particularly in
areas where widespread drilling is occurring, can be extensive.
The federal Clean Water Act requires that shale gas operators obtain general stormwater
permits. Federal regulations under the Clean Water Act are usually implemented by state
agencies, and as part of the approvals process, operators must submit a notice of intent as well
as a storm water pollution prevention plan to the appropriate state agency. 34 These pollution
prevention plans are not site-specific and involve the implementation of Best Management
1 LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 76: 1., § 301 (B)(5), (E), (F), (Q).
13 Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 35.
132 Schlumberger Oilfield Glossary, "Pad."
33 N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining
Regulatory Program," 5-10, 5-11.
34 Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 36.
These pollution prevention plans are often known as "stormwater erosion and sediment control plans,"
"sediment and erosion control plans," "stormwater management plans," or something similar in
different state regulations.
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Practices, which means that they tend to be relatively consistent across the states included in
this review. 135
Of the states reviewed, some, such as Texas and Oklahoma, appear to follow EPA guidelines
under the Clean Water Act and require that operators apply for stormwater permits as required
under federal law. 136 The permits issued by these states, in line with Clean Water Act
requirements, serve to control the sedimentation of waterways near well pads and limit the
quantity of pollutants, such as diesel and other chemicals, that would enter waterways due to
leakage from equipment and general industrial activity.137
Some states have regulations that go beyond the scope of the federal Clean Water Act. For
example, New York requires operators to secure general stormwater permits that are specific
to gas drilling operations (in contrast to the "general industrial" permits generally granted by
states following EPA guidelines) and requires them to secure individual State Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permits for stormwater discharges that are located within 500
feet of principal aquifers.138 Louisiana, in addition to requiring a Louisiana Water Discharge
Permit System permit for stormwater runoff, places limits on the amount of chemical oxygen
demand, organic carbon, chloride, oil, and grease that can enter waterways through
stormwater flow.13 9
Pennsylvania differentiates between the different types of surface waterways that are likely to
be affected by stormwater flow, with an erosion and sediment control plan required for
disturbances to land surfaces of as little as 5,000 square feet if the runoff would flow into "High
Quality" or "Exceptional Value" waters, as defined by state code, and a more general permit,
called the "Erosion and Sediment Control and Stormwater Management for Oil and Gas
Exploration, Production, Processing, Treatment Operations or Transmission Facilities General
Permit," required for any earth disturbance that is 5 acres or larger. 40
New York, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania, which have regulations that go beyond the baselines
requirements promulgated by EPA under the Clean Water Act, appear to be striving for similar
13s Ibid.
136 Ibid., 42.
137 ibid., 35.
138 N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining
Regulatory Program," 7-26-29.
139 LA. Admin. Code tit. 33:IX, § 708(4).
140 Governor's Marcellus Shale Advisory Commission, Governor's Marcellus Shale Advisory Commission,
Final Report, 70.
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goals as the EPA in terms of seeking to minimize sedimentation due to construction and erosion
and limit harmful runoff of chemicals from well pads.
Colorado, along with concerns about sedimentation and contamination of waterways, also
highlights concerns about adverse impacts on wildlife due to habitat loss and fragmentation in
its regulations. If an operator applies to locate a well within a "sensitive wildlife habitat or a
restricted surface occupancy area," the operator is required to consult about impacts on
wildlife with the Colorado Division of Wildlife, the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission, and the surface owner of the land under which drilling will occur.14 ' Operators
also have the option to submit a Comprehensive Drilling Plan to the Colorado Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission, and the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, the
Colorado Division of Wildlife, "local government designee(s)," and affected surface owners. All
of these stakeholders are invited, under state regulations, to participate in developing the plan,
which often leads to "identification of potential impacts and development of conditions of
approval to minimize adverse impacts." 142 Colorado also prescribes a number of other
measures to both reduce impact on waterways and on habitat, such as requiring that,
"[e]xisting roads shall be used to the greatest extent practicable to avoid erosion and minimize
the land area devoted to oil and gas operations." 4 3 State regulations also mandate that,
"[w]here possible, operators shall provide for the development of multiple reservoirs by drilling
on existing pads or by multiple completions or commingling in existing wellbores,"044 and,
"[w]here feasible, operators shall use directional drilling to reduce cumulative impacts and
adverse impacts on wildlife resources." 145
Locating the Well Pad, Well, Pits, and Disposal Sites
Once the operator has secured the required stormwater permits as required under federal and
state laws, it will construct the well pad. The pad will contain other facilities necessary for gas
development, including the well itself, storage facilities for materials and wastes in the form of
pits and tanks, and on-site waste pits.
In addition to stormwater permits, all of the states covered in this review have additional
regulations pertaining to where a well pad and/or its associated facilities can be placed. State
regulations mandate that certain gas drilling facilities be set back from certain items, such as
drinking water resources, wetlands, and structures in order to prevent damage to these
141 2 COLO. CODE REGS. 404-1:1202 (b)-(c).
142 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:216(d).
143 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:1002 (e)(4).
44 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:603(d).
143 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:1002(d).
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domestic and natural resources and property. Different regulatory models for each of these
protected items will be described in turn.
States have opted to pursue a variety of approaches in regulating the placement of gas
extraction facilities in relation to drinking water resources such as public water supplies and
private water wells. The most intricate, and incidentally, aggressive regulations have been
adopted by Colorado and New York (in the case of New York, the regulations were written but
had not been approved at the time of writing). Both states have a detailed setback, or
"buffer zone," system to protect drinking water supplies. In this type of approach, regulations
specify the distances between extraction equipment and drinking water resources as well as
the types of gas extraction equipment that must be set back specific distances from drinking
water resources.
Colorado, for example, has defined three "buffer zones" in which specific types of equipment,
and therefore activities are restricted. 147 The internal buffer zone (0-300 feet from the water
resource), nearest to public water facilities, prohibits any gas drilling and completion activity.148
In the intermediate buffer zone (301-500 feet from the water resource), restrictions are placed
on gas extraction activity; for example, operators are required to use "closed-loop" systems in
which all chemicals and wastes are stored in steel tanks as opposed to pits and various other
protections are implemented.149 In the external buffer zone (501-2640 feet from the water
resource), operators are also required to store material in tanks (although the system does not
have to be a "closed-loop" system with the attendant protections required in the intermediate
buffer zone) and are required to conduct pre-drilling and post-drilling groundwater testing for a
set of defined chemicals.150 The regulations are further differentiated in terms of requirements
for extraction equipment that pre-dated the promulgation of the regulations and new
equipment that is installed, with the regulations requiring stricter controls on new
equipment.151
Some states follow a less aggressive approach than Colorado and New York by identifying
specific high-risk activities on the well pad and specifying that these should be set back from
drinking water resources. Some states also take into account particularly high-risk areas, such
as 100-year floodplains, when determining setback requirements for specific facilities. In other
46 Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 45-
46.
4 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317B.
148 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317B(c).
149 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317B(d).
150 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317B(e).
1s1 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317B.
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words, the regulations take into account not only the likelihood and adverse consequences of
human or mechanical error, but also on the likelihood of natural occurrences such as floods.
Arkansas and Oklahoma both follow this approach.1 s2 For example, Arkansas' regulations read,
in part: "Mud, Circulation, and Reserve Pits constructed within the 100 year flood plain must be
in accordance with any county or other local ordinance or requirement pertaining to the 100-
year flood plain." 153
Finally, of the states reviewed, Texas has the most lenient approach to protecting water
resources, as it appears not to require any sort of setback from public water supplies, private
wells, or streams. The only setbacks that Texas regulations seem to require are setbacks from
structures.154
In terms of setbacks from buildings and other structures, the regulatory approach among the
reviewed states is relatively consistent, with required setbacks generally ranging from 150 feet
to 500 feet, depending on the state and the circumstances of the situation. For example,
Colorado and Louisiana both mandate that the required setback distance be greater in "high-
density" or "urban" areas.155 Arkansas and Colorado require greater setbacks from "public use
buildings" and "group facilities" than from other types of buildings.156 Some states, including
Louisiana and Pennsylvania, specify minimum setbacks for gas production equipment but allow
for the setback to be waived if the operator can secure written consent from the building
owner. 157 Finally, Texas sets a state-wide minimum setback of 200 feet from private
residences, and prohibits the drilling of a well "in the thickly settled part of the municipality,"
but allows local jurisdictions, such as municipalities and counties, to set stricter requirements,
as needed.58
The final category of setbacks covered in this review is setbacks from wetlands. Similar to
setbacks from water resources, states take a variety of approaches and evidence different
motivations in creating their regulations. Colorado's regulations make clear that that state is
152 Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 46.
153 AOGC, RULE B-17(f) (2012).
1s4 See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(d)(4) (providing pit requirements); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.37
(providing well spacing requirements but no setback requirements); TEX. LG. CODE ANN. § 253.005(c)
(providing setbacks from structures).
155 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:603, STATE OF LA. OFFICE OF CONSERVATION, ORDER NO. U-HS at 2(A)
(2009), available at http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/OC/eng div/20090806-U-HS.pdf.
1s6 AOGC Rule B-26 (c)(5)(A), (d)(4)(A) (2012), 2 COLO. CODE REGS. 404-1:603.
1s7 STATE OF LA. OFFICE OF CONSERVATION, ORDER NO. U-HS at 2(A) (2009), available at
http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/OC/eng div/20090806-U-HS.pdf, 58 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215(a).
158 TEX. LG. CODE ANN. § 253.005(c), Rahm, "Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing in Shale Gas Plays," 2978-
2979.
Chapter 3 - State Regulations 43
seeking to protect habitat and minimize environmental harm in its directive to operators to
"avoid or minimize impacts to wetlands and riparian habitats to the degree practicable," by
"incorporat[ing] adequate measures and controls to prevent significant adverse environmental
impacts."159 Louisiana allows for the use of drilling equipment in wetlands, but requires
sequestration of the drilling site through the use of either dikes or impervious decking with
curbs, gutters, and/or sumps.16 0 Louisiana's intention seems to be to localize any adverse
impact on wetland habitat and waters through containment measures. Various states reviewed
(Arkansas, New York, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania) require setbacks from wetlands for either
the entire well site (Pennsylvania) or for specific equipment and practices (New York &
Arkansas specify oil/fueling tanks and fluid storage tanks; Oklahoma specifies waste disposal of
produced water, drill fluids, and drill cuttings).' Arkansas' regulations cite the proximity of the
water table to the surface in wetlands environments and, in situation "where [the] water table
is 10 ft. or less below surfaces," requires use of above-ground pits or closed loop systems.1 In
this case, Arkansas demonstrates a concern for contamination of underground water supplies.
Finally, Texas, as noted above with regards to water supplies, similarly appears to have no
mandated setbacks from wetland environments.163
Drilling and Casing a Well; Preventing Blowouts
Once the well pad has been constructed, the next stage of the shale gas production process is
to drill the production well. Securing the wellbore through adequate structural protections in
the form of casing (steel pipes) and cement as well as mechanisms to control blowouts
(uncontrolled fluid flows into the wellbore due to high pressures underground) is critical for
preventing groundwater contamination due to leakages from the well.' 64 States regulate both
of these aspects, structural protection and blowout prevention, in significant detail, although
there are some differences in the approach that states take. This review will cover a few key
aspects of these structural and blowout regulations, namely the depth to which casing must be
installed, the strength of casing used, requirements to test cement integrity and submit a log
reporting on the testing, and blowout prevention regulations.
159 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:1002 (e)(2), 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:901 (f).
160 LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33:V, §.1121.
161 AOGC, RULE B-17 (f)(1)(D) (2012), AOGC, RULE B-26 (c)(5)(C), (d)(4)(C) (2012), N.Y. Dept. of
Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Regulatory
Program," 7-34, OKLA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 165:10-7-17, 10-7-19 10-7-26, 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3215(b)(3).
162 AOGC, RULE B-17 (f)(1)(D) (2012).
163 See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(d)(4) (providing pit requirements); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.37
(providing well spacing requirements but no setback requirements).
164 Ground Water Protection Council, State Oil and Natural Gas Regulations Designed to Protect Water
Resources, 21.
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It should be noted that most regulations in this area were written before the widespread use of
high-volume hydraulic fracturing practices and most states have not updated their regulations
since that time. The technical requirements for a conventional well and for a shale gas well are
largely the same, although the practice of high-volume hydraulic fracturing does place greater
pressure on the casing and other well components. 16 Some states, such as Pennsylvania and
New York, have updated their regulations on well construction and blowout prevention to take
into account the particular challenges presented by the use of hydraulic fracturing in shale gas
extraction.
States generally take one of two approaches when it comes to regulating how deep casing must
be installed. Some states prescribe a required length for the casing in all cases, while others
have general requirements that casing be sufficient to protect groundwater (and may prescribe
required lengths if groundwater is encountered while drilling). Oklahoma and New York are
examples of the first type of approach, in which a required length is prescribed in all cases.
Oklahoma require that casing be installed 50 feet below the lowest fresh groundwater or 90
feet below the surface, whichever is deeper.166 Pennsylvania's regulations are similar, but
slightly different, in requiring that casing be installed 50 feet below the lowest fresh
groundwater or 50 feet into consolidated rock, whichever is deeper. 16 Note that there is a
difference between the two states, in that Oklahoma measures depth from the surface whereas
Pennsylvania requires that casing be installed into consolidated rock, no matter how far from
the surface. The second type of approach, of having a generalized requirement to protect fresh
water, can be seen in Texas' regulations, which reads in part: "set and cement sufficient surface
casing to protect all usable-quality water strata."168
Similar to regulations on the depth to which casing must be installed, regulations on the
required strength of casing can be grouped into two categories, the first prescribing a required
strength (in some cases, linked to the specifics of that well) and the second category requiring a
more general standard. The first, more specified, approach can be seen in New York, which
requires that casing undergo a mill test of at least 1,000 psi, and in Texas, which requires that
casing must be "hydrostatically pressure tested with an applied pressure at least equal to the
maximum pressure to which the pipe will be subjected in the well."169 The second, more
165 Lustgarten, "Why Gas Leaks Matter in the Hydraulic Fracturing Debate."
16 6 OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-4.
167 25 PA. CODE § 78.83 (2011).
168 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.13.
169 N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining
Regulatory Program," 7-50, 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.13.
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general approach, can be seen in Oklahoma, which specifies only that "oil field grade steel
casing" be used, and in Colorado, which mandates that casing "protect any potential oil or gas
bearing horizons penetrated during drilling from infiltration of injurious waters from other
sources, and to prevent the migration of oil, gas or water from one (1) horizon to another, that
may result in the degradation of ground water." 70
The states reviewed generally require submissions of a log (variously called a bond log, a
cement log, or similar) to demonstrate that the cement used to seal the gaps between the
casing and well wall and between the layers of casing is structurally sound. Some states require
that logs be submitted in all cases while other states only require submission of logs under
specific circumstances. Colorado, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas require submission of logs
in all circumstances; for example, Colorado requires copies of "all logs run," specifying that this
includes "mechanical, mud, or other."171 In contrast, Arkansas and Oklahoma require that logs
be submitted only under certain circumstances.72 For example, Oklahoma requires submission
of logs to the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, Oil and Gas Conservation Division if the
agency does not witness the fracturing operation or in site-specific circumstances. 3
In addition to the various regulations that states have in place to protect against well failure,
states also regulate the blowout prevention equipment and procedures that operators must
install in case a well does fail. Some states have prescriptive regulations, requiring that specific
blowout prevention equipment be in place, whereas others have introduced performance-
based regulation. In the prescriptive model, Colorado requires that, in high-density areas, rigs
with Kelly must have: "double ram with blind ram and pipe ram; annular preventer or a rotating
head," while rigs without Kelly must have "double ram with blind ram and pipe ram." 74 In
contrast, Texas' performance-based model requires that blowout prevention equipment must
"satisfy any reasonable test which may be required by the commission or its duly accredited
agent."175
70 OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-4, 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404- 1:317.
171 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:308(a), N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS
on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Regulatory Program," 7-54, 25 PA. CODE § 78.74, 16 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.16, (b),(c).
172 AOGC, RULE B-19(f) (2011), STRONGER, Inc., Oklahoma Hydraulic Fracturing State Review.
13 ibid.
174 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:603.
175 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.13(b).
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Controlling Air Emissions
The process of drilling and hydraulically fracturing a well emits a variety of emissions into the
air, including nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, volatile organic compounds
(VOCs), and hazardous air pollutants such as benzene. 6 While many of these substances are
regulated under the Clean Air Act, most oil and gas production operations historically have not
been subject to these controls because the Clean Air Act focuses on "major sources" (sources
that emit a minimum number of tons per year of a given pollutant) whereas individual gas wells
do not meet these minimums and are therefore "minor sources."' The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency released new rules in April 2012 that enhance regulation of air pollution
from the oil and natural gas industry at the federal level (much of which is delegated and
carried out by individual states). 78 Beyond the baseline regulations laid out at the federal level,
states have discretion to implement minor source control programs, and some have done so,
although, at the time of writing, the majority of states covered in this review have taken very
limited action in response to air emissions from natural gas production.
New York and Colorado have gone the furthest in regulating air emissions from natural gas
production activities. New York has proposed a significant number of specific measures and
controls on air emissions from shale gas operations. For example, New York has proposed
regulations prohibiting the simultaneous operation of drilling and fracturing engines on one
well pad and that the diesel used in engines be "limited to ULSF [ultra-low sulfur diesel] with a
maximum sulfur content of 15 ppm."' 7 9 New York also has proposed limiting to four "[t]he
maximum number of wells to be drilled and completed annually or during any consecutive 12-
month period at a single pad."' 80 The state's proposed regulations also require vapor recovery
systems on condensate tanks to capture VOC emissions.' 8' Gas also escapes during the
flowback stage (when fluids flow back to the surface up the well after hydraulic fracturing), and
New York has proposed limiting the venting of gas to "a maximum of 5 MMscf [million standard
cubic feet] during any consecutive 12-month period."' In addition, among other regulations,
New York has proposed that the operator be required to "construct and operate the site in
accordance with a greenhouse gas emissions impacts mitigation plan" that would involve, for
176 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Overview of Final Amendments to Air Regulations for the Oil
and Natural Gas Industry - Fact Sheet."
m Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 73-
74.
178 US EPA, "Oil and Natural Gas Air Pollution Standards."
179 N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining
Regulatory Program," 7-108.
180 Ibid.
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example, implementation of EPA's Natural Gas STAR Best Management Practices, reduced-
emission completions, creation of a leak detection and repair program, and on-demand
reporting under the EPA's GHG reporting rule.183
Colorado regulations require that condensate tanks, crude oil tanks, and produced water tanks
with the potential to emit at least five tons of VOCs per year must capture 95 percent of their
VOCs when these tanks are located within a quarter mile of facilities such as schools, nursing
homes, and jails within certain counties.184 Glycol dehydrators and pits under similar conditions
must capture 90 percent of their VOC emissions.185 Colorado's regulations also require green
completion practices (that capture methane and other air emissions) be implemented for wells
that are likely to emit 500,000 cubic feet per day (500 MCFD); specific green completion
practices that are required are specified in the regulations.186
Besides New York and Colorado, most states reviewed here have taken minimal action to limit
air emissions from shale gas development sites. Texas and Pennsylvania have implemented
monitoring programs. The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality has implemented an
extensive emissions monitoring program in the Barnett Shale and Pennsylvania conducted a
more limited monitoring program over three months in 2010.187 Oklahoma requires that rigs
have a "suitable" stack height for flaring in order to "prevent a hazard to people or
property."
Withdrawing Water for Hydraulic Fracturing
High-volume hydraulic fracturing requires significant quantities of water be injected
underground to fracture the shale and release the trapped natural gas, allowing it to flow up
the well to the surface. The water is mixed with fracturing fluids and proppants, but the vast
majority of the solution that is injected underground is water. Each fracturing treatment
typically requires between 2.4 and 7.8 million gallons of water, varying due to differences in
geology between different shales.189 Although this volume of water per fracturing treatment,
even when multiplied across the many wells that may be dug in a given area, represents only a
183 ibid., 7-116-117.
184 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:805(b)(2).
185 Ibid.
186 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:805(b)(3).
187 Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, "Barnett Shale Emissions"; Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection, Northcentral Pennsylvania Marcellus Shale Short-Term Ambient Air Sampling
Report.
188 OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-15.
189 N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining
Regulatory Program," 8.
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tiny fraction of annual use for all other water uses across a state, the impact on specific water
sources that become overburdened, especially in arid regions, can be significant.190
Laws controlling water use vary significantly from state to state. In all of the states covered in
this review, though, a shale gas operator must either secure water rights before withdrawing
water or must purchase water from someone with water rights and the authorization to sell
water under those rights.191 Water rights in these states are structured in diverse ways. In
most eastern states, water rights have traditionally been allocated under a riparian regime in
which those whose land abuts the water source have usage rights to the water.192 In most
western states, water rights have traditionally allocated under a prior appropriation regime
under which users who put water to beneficial use have the right to continued use of the
water.193 Today, most states have supplemented, or even supplanted, these common law
underpinnings with statutes and regulations that control water withdrawal and usage, and
shale gas operators seeking to withdraw water are subject to these various rules.194 Some
states covered in this review require operators to secure both water rights and a permit to
withdraw a limited quantity of water. Other states require operators to secure a permit only
under specific circumstances, while some require reporting of quantities of water used. Finally,
a few states have implemented regulations encouraging or requiring reuse of flowback water
(injected water that flows back to the surface) in multiple fracture treatments.
Pennsylvania and New York have relatively strict water withdrawal regimes, underpinned by
the use of permits to regulate fresh water use by shale gas operators. Both of these states
require that operators obtain permits before withdrawing water either from ground or surface
sources. 195 In these permit applications, operators are required to designate the sources from
which they will withdraw water and the quantity that will be withdrawn from those sources.
Operators are required to conduct analysis of the impacts of their proposed withdrawals and
demonstrate that their actions will not cause, for example in New York, a degradation of the
190 Rahm and Riha, "Toward Strategic Management of Shale Gas Development," 15; Rahm, "Regulating
Hydraulic Fracturing in Shale Gas Plays," 2976.
191 Weston, "Water and Wastewater Issues in Conducting Operations in a Shale Play -The Appalachian
Basin Experience," 9.
192 Ibid., 10.
193 Smith, "Governing Water," 445.
194 Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 83-
84.
195 58 PENN. STAT. § 3211; 6 NYCRR § 601.3 (2011).
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quality of the water source such that it no longer accords with the guidelines of its "designated
best use."196
Pennsylvania's regulations, for example, require operators to submit a "water management
plan" to the state's Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), which the agency must
approve before the operator is permitted to begin drawing water.197 The operator must
describe the water source, its location, the average daily quantity that it proposes to withdraw,
and the maximum withdrawal rate.' 98 The water management plan also requires that
operators conduct a low-flow analysis of surface waterways from which they propose to
withdraw water, a withdrawal-impacts analysis describing how the withdrawal will be designed
to minimize adverse impact on aquatic life and habitat, and a natural diversity inventory.199
Pennsylvania law requires that the DEP only approve a water management plan if the operator
demonstrates that withdrawal will not adversely impact the quantity or quality of water in the
source, will not adversely impact water quality in the watershed, and will meet passby flow
conditions.20o
Some states require permitting for withdrawals in limited circumstances or have enacted
regulations granting state authorities jurisdiction to protect the health of waterways and the
rights of riparian rights holders. Colorado requires that parties seeking to withdraw
groundwater outside of designated groundwater basins secure a permit from the state
engineer before doing so.201 Opinions by Louisiana's Attorney General have established that
River Waterway Districts possess authority to "maintain proper" water depths and regulate
water use and that running water may not be "taken out of a channel in a volume that would
impair the rights of riparian owners."202
Texas does not require any sort of prior permit for water withdrawal, but does require
reporting of the total volume of water used.203 Colorado similarly requires reporting of total
196 N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining
Regulatory Program," 7-3.
197 Weston, "Water and Wastewater Issues in Conducting Operations in a Shale Play - The Appalachian
Basin Experience," 18.
198 PA Department of Environmental Protection, "Water Management Plan Example Format Instructions
for Marcellus Shale Gas Well Development."
199 ibid.
200 58 PENN. STAT. § 3211(m)(2).
201 COL. STAT. REV. § 37-90-137 (2011).
202 State of La., Atty. Gen. Op. 10-0289 at 3 (Feb. 22, 2011); State of La., Atty. Gen. Op. 08-0176 at 3
(Mar. 17, 2010).
203 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29 (c)(2)(A)(viii).
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volume of water used and Louisiana requires reporting of both the volume and the source of
water.204
Apart from permitting and reporting on water usage, a few states have enacted regulations to
either require or encourage the reuse of flowback water in multiple fracture treatments.
Pennsylvania requires operators to develop a "wastewater source reduction strategy" (which
simultaneously reduces both new water withdrawn and wastewater produced) to "maximize
the recycling and reuse of flow back or production fluid either to fracture other natural gas
wells, or for other beneficial uses." 205 Arkansas and Oklahoma amended their regulations to
allow for reuse of flowback water.206
Disclosure of Hydraulic Fracturing Chemicals
The chemicals that are mixed with water in order to fracture shale and release gas deposits
have received a tremendous amount of press and have caused widespread public concern
about contamination of groundwater.20 Accentuating this public concern was the fact that,
until recently, operators were not required to disclose the chemicals they were injecting into
the ground as part of the fracturing process, thereby driving anxiety about all the chemicals
that could be in use.
The federal Emergency Planning and Community-Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA) and the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHAct) have required that operators keep material safety
data sheets (MSDS) for certain chemicals stored above threshold quantities.208 These rules
have only covered some of the chemicals used in the fracturing process, however, thereby
failing to alleviate public concerns. All of the states covered in this review have taken steps to
supplement basic MSDS disclosure although they have done so in somewhat different ways.
All seven states reviewed have either passed regulations, or propose to put in place regulations,
that would require information to be disclosed about all chemicals used in the fracturing
process, specifically the trade name of the chemicals, their Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS)
204 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:205A; Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, "State Office of
Conservation Requiring Reporting of Water Source in Hydraulic Fracturing Operations."
205 25 PA. CODE § 95.10.
206 AOGC, RULE B-19(j) (2012), OKLA. ADMIN. CODE 165:10- 7-24 (b)(3), (c)(1).
207 Groat and Grimshaw, Fact-Based Regulation for Environmental Protection in Shale Gas Development,
9-13.
208 US EPA, "Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA)"; US EPA, "Summary of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act."
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numbers, and maximum concentration. Some states also require information about the
supplier of and purpose of each chemical as relates to the fracturing process.209
Although most of the reviewed states require reporting of chemicals used only after fracturing
has been completed, Arkansas requires operators to report on which chemicals they anticipate
using, and New York has proposed to do the same. 0 Wiseman and Gradijan note that,
although prior disclosure "likely would better protect human health and the environment, [it]
may be difficult in light of the fact that operators often change fluids and concentrations used
in fracturing as they learn more about the formation into which they have drilled."m
All of the states reviewed allow for operators to declare that certain additives are "trade
secrets" and are thereby exempt from disclosure. All reviewed states also create an exception
from this trade secrets provision if needed by healthcare professionals or in the event of an
emergency.21 2
Preventing and Reporting Spills
Spills of hazardous substances, such as diesel fuel, fracturing fluids, and wastes, can occur in a
variety of ways, posing public health and environmental hazards. For example, spills could
occur during transport of equipment, during the hydraulic fracturing injection process, due to
leakage from storage pits, or during transfer from the well to a storage pit or tank, among other
possibilities.m
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
requires operators to report spills of hazardous substances over a threshold level and can
require operators to pay cleanup costs.214 States have implemented various regulations to
supplement CERCLA in those areas that CERCLA covers, such as reporting requirements and
209 AOGC Rule 19(k) (2012); 2 COLO. CODE REGS. 404-1:205; 2 COLO. CODE REGS. 404-1:100; 2 COLO.
CODE REGS. § 404-1:205A; LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33:IX, § 708 (2011); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43:XIX, § 118
(C)(1); N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution
Mining Regulatory Program," 8-30-31; OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-10(b); 58 PA. STAT. §
3222(b.1)(1)(i); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29 (c)(2)(A)(ix),(x),(xi).
210 Ibid.
21 Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 98-
99.
212 AOGC Rule 19(k) (2012); 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:205A; LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43:XIX, § 118
(C)(2); N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution
Mining Regulatory Program," 8-31; OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-10(b); 58 PA. STAT. § 3222.1(d2); 16
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29 (c)(4), (f)(1).
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cleanup of spills, and also in areas that CERCLA does not cover, such as implementing spill-
prevention measures.
States have implemented varying regulations about how quickly operators must report spills.
For example, at least under certain circumstances, Colorado and New York require reporting of
spills immediately. Colorado requires immediate notification of the nearby public water system
if any spill occurs within a buffer-zone area.21 s New York has proposed that operators be
required to notify authorities verbally within two hours of the discovery of the spill.26 In
contrast, some states allow for passage of significantly more time before a spill must be
reported. For example, Arkansas requires that any spill be reported within 24 hours and
Oklahoma requires only that all discharges to water and spills on land of greater volume than
10 barrels be reported within 24 hours.
States also take different approaches to what quantity of material spilled triggers reporting.
New York has proposed that "any spill" be reported within two hours. 218 Colorado and
Oklahoma both differentiate between spills affecting water sources and those not affecting
water sources. Both states require that any spill impacting water sources be reported;
Colorado requires that a release of over 5 barrels of hazardous material to land be reported
while Oklahoma requires that a release of over 10 barrels of hazardous material to land be
reported.21 9
Most of the states reviewed supplement CERCLA with mandated spill prevention measures
required for shale gas operators (as well as other oil and gas operators). Louisiana, New York,
and Pennsylvania all require operators to develop spill prevention and control programs
involving both preventative measures and containment plans in the event of a spill.220 Some
states direct operators to implement specific controls to prevent and contain spills and specify
required upkeep and maintenance of these mechanisms to ensure that they are functional in
215 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317B.
216 N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining
Regulatory Program," 7-57.
217 AOGC, RULE B-19 (i) (2012); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE 165: 10-7-5.
218 N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining
Regulatory Program," 7-57.
219 2 COLO. CODE REGS. 404-1:337, 906(b); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-601(2); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE 165:
10-7-5.
2 LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33:IX, § 905; N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on
the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Regulatory Program," 7-27-29; PA. Dept. of Environmental Protection,
"Oil and Gas Management Practices Guidelines for a Preparedness, Prevention, and Contingency (PPC)
Plan for Oil and Gas Development" at 3 (2001), available at
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the event of a spill. For example, Arkansas specifies that certain types of equipment be
surrounded by containment dikes or other containment structures and that the reservoir in the
dike must be kept free of excessive vegetation, stormwater, etc.221 Texas appears to be the
only state, of those reviewed, that does not specify spill prevention and control measures at the
state level, as the section of its regulations titled "Spill Prevention and Control" focus on
reporting and cleanup of spills and do not include prevention measures.m
Testing and Replacing Water Supplies
Concerns about groundwater contamination are central to public apprehension about shale gas
extraction. In particular, there has been significant controversy about the source and cause of
methane or chemical contaminants that have been detected in water supplies near shale gas
223drilling sites. In some cases, testing by state authorities has indicated that the methane or
chemical contaminants pre-dated the beginning of local shale gas drilling or comes from
another source, but local residents doubt these findings for myriad reasons. 22 4
Of the states covered in this review, Colorado, Louisiana, New York, and Pennsylvania have all
implemented regulations requiring or incentivizing baseline testing of groundwater before
drilling begins, at least under some circumstances.2 2 s Baseline testing can serve to establish the
contaminants in the water that pre-date drilling, provide residents with proof when
contamination is caused by local shale gas development, and provide data for research on
contamination pathways.2 26
Colorado requires baseline testing as well as data collection for up to three months after local
shale gas production operations conclude for surface water sources located within the buffer
zones near public water systems.2 Pennsylvania does not require baseline testing but,
through statute and regulation, incentivizes drilling operators and homeowners to have
baseline testing conducted. The state does so by establishing a rebuttable presumption that
221 AOGC, RULE B-6 (2012).
222 TX. ADMIN. CODE, 30 TAC 327.
223 For example, the film "Gasland" documented a number of families and households that attributed
contamination of their drinking water source to nearby shale gas production.
224 For example, the Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission released a statement rebutting some
of the claims made in the film "Gasland" about sources of groundwater contamination in Colorado. See
Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission, "COGCC Gasland Correction Document."
22s 2 COLO. CODE REGS. 404-1:317(b); 43 LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43:XIX, § 309; N.Y. Dept. of
Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Regulatory
Program," 1-10; 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3218; 25 PA. CODE § 78.52.
226 Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 114.
227 2 COLO. CODE REGS. 404-1:317(b).
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any contamination of groundwater that occurs within 2,500 feet of the well and is discovered
and reported within 12 months of the completion of unconventional gas development activities
(which includes shale gas development) is due to the actions of the shale gas operation.2  As a
result, drilling operators, at risk of being held responsible, face a significant incentive to conduct
baseline testing before they begin operations.
Pennsylvania also requires that, in case contamination as a result of the shale gas operation is
found, the operator provide a replacement water supply. State regulations articulate a number
of criteria by which the replacement supply must be equivalent to the previous supply,
including reliability, cost, maintenance, control, quality, quantity, and serviceability.229
Besides Pennsylvania, the other states covered in this review do not appear to have regulations
in place concerning provision of replacement water if contamination occurs.
Storing Wastes
The drilling and fracturing processes create various types of waste, including drill cuttings,
drilling fluids (also known as drilling muds), flowback water, and produced water. Before
permanent disposal, these waste products are generally stored on site at the well pad or
nearby, either in pits or in steel tanks. States regulate the storage of waste because these
waste products can contaminate soil and water, thereby causing harm to humans, wildlife, and
livestock."
States take a wide variety of approaches to regulating the storage of waste at the production
site. Most states reviewed allow for the storage of waste in pits, imposing regulations on how
these pits must be structured in order to ensure integrity of the storage and prevent leakage. A
couple of states prohibit the use of pits in favor of steel tanks, at least under certain
circumstances. All of the states reviewed have similar requirements about the required height
of freeboard-the distance between the normal storage level and the top of the pit.
Pits are a common method of storing waste from the drilling and fracturing processes. All of
the states reviewed regulate or provide some guidelines for how the pits must be constructed
or how they must perform in terms of holding waste products. These performance
requirements are expressed in the form of requirements for the pit liners. Some states have
established performance standards in terms of the hydraulic conductivity that in permissible in
228 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3218; 25 PA. CODE § 78.52.
229 25 PA. CODE § 78.51.
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pit lining. For example, Louisiana and Pennsylvania both specify that the pit liner must have a
hydraulic conductivity of no more than 1x10 7 cm/sec.23 ' Louisiana allows for the pit lining to be
made of diverse materials, such as natural soil (i.e. clay), a soil mixture, or synthetic materials,
while Pennsylvania specifies that a "synthetic flexible liner" should be used.2 2 Other states
seek to limit seepage from the pit by specifying a required minimum thickness of the liner. For
example, Arkansas requires that pits have a liner composed of compacted clay and a 40-mil
synthetic liner. Colorado requires that, within the intermediate and external buffer zones,
pits have a synthetic liner of 24-mil thickness and a soil foundation compacted 12 inches.23 4 As
can be seen from Colorado's example, some states require different standards in different
areas. Oklahoma, similarly, requires the use of synthetic liners in wellhead protection areas
and within 1 mile of active municipal water wells.23s All of the reviewed states require that,
when pits are used to store waste, that 2 feet of freeboard be present in case of extra
unanticipated wastes, heavy precipitation, etc.236
New York and Colorado have both enacted measures (or proposed measures, in the case of
New York) to prohibit the use of pits under certain circumstances. Colorado requires the use of
pits within some portions of the buffer zones surrounding public water systems.2 New York
has proposed that only water-tight steel tanks be allowed for any extraction activity in the
Marcellus shale that use high volumes of water, which would encompass high-volume hydraulic
fracturing. 238 While steel tanks and closed-loop systems diminish the likelihood of seepages
and spills of hazardous materials as compared with pits, they increase costs for operators.2 39
Disposing of Wastes
One of the final parts of the shale gas extraction process involves disposing of the waste
products produced during drilling and hydraulic fracturing of the well. As noted in the previous
section, the key waste products are drill cuttings, drilling fluids, flowback water, and produced
2 LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43:XIX, § 307; 25 PA. CODE § 78.56.
232 Ibid.
233 AOGC, RULE B-17 (g)(2)(A) (2012).
234 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:904 Rule 317B.
23s OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-7-16.
236 AOGC, Rule B-17 (f)(2)(A), (g)(2)(A) (2012); 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:902(b); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit.
33:IX, § 708(C)(1); N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and
Solution Mining Regulatory Program," Appendix 10; OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-7-16; 25 PA. CODE §
78.56(a); 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 218.20(c).
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water. The shale gas development process, in its use of high-volume hydraulic fracturing, has
caused a significant uptick in the volume of flowback water and produced water that is
produced and must be disposed of. While states have established procedures and regulations
in place for managing the disposal of drill cuttings and drilling fluids (generally through land-
spreading, the use of landfills, or at the drilling site itself), many states have struggled to adapt
to the high volumes of flowback water and produced water produced as a side-effect of shale
gas development.24 0
Although disposal practices vary from state to state and even region to region in larger states,
generally operators in the northeast dispose of liquid wastes through publicly owned treatment
works (POTWs) while operators in southern and western states tend to use underground
injection control (UIC) wells for disposal of liquid wastes. 24 ' Both of these disposal mechanisms
present environmental and health risks, however, if not controlled adequately. POITWs are
typically designed to treat domestic sewage waste and not to treat industrial wastewater. As a
result, if flowback water and produced water from shale gas wells are not adequately pre-
treated before being treated at a POTW, levels of total dissolved solids, naturally-occurring
radioactive substances, and other contaminants can remain in the water despite the treatment
process and enter the environment when the POTW releases the water after treatment.242 UIC
wells can cause contamination of groundwater sources and localized seismic activity if they are
not properly constructed and operated.24 3
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency regulates POTWs under the Clean Water Act and
regulates UIC wells under the Safe Drinking Water Act.2 44 Some states have also supplemented
federal regulations with their own regulations and restrictions on disposal. A few states have
introduced regulations requiring operators to create a plan for water management and waste
disposal prior to drilling a well as well as reporting on actual disposal volumes and practices.
For example, Colorado requires that operators develop a "plan for the management of
exploration and production wastes." 245 As described in the section on water withdrawal,
above, Pennsylvania requires that operators create a "wastewater source reduction strategy"
to maximize reuse of flowback and produced waters.246
240 Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 126.
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242 ibid., 131.
243 ibid.
244 US EPA, "Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW) General Permit"; US EPA, "Regulations -
Underground Injection Control."
24s 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1: 216(e).
246 25 PA. CODE § 95.10.
Chapter 3 - State Regulations 57
Although some states continue to use POTWs for processing and disposal of wastewater from
shale gas development, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has expressed concern about
the capacity and adequacy of these facilities to properly treat these wastes.2 4 7 In April 2011,
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection "requested" that operators no
longer send their waste to POTWs; since that time, it appears that most operators are either
reusing wastewater or sending it out of state for disposal. 248
Conclusion
The seven states covered in this survey of state regulations are located in different parts of the
country and have different histories of oil and gas development, diverse geological and
environmental conditions, and varying attitudes about the appropriate role for government in
regulating economic activity.
Table 1, below, summarizes which states have enacted regulations for each stage of the shale
gas development process. In situations where a federal standards exists, such as for
stormwater permitting under the Clean Water Act when constructing a well pad and access
roads, states only receive a check mark if they have regulations that go beyond the required
baseline federal regulations.
Table 1: Regulations for each stage of shale gas development, by state.
Arkansas Colorado Louisiana New Oklahoma Pennsylvania Texas
York
Testing for gas 11 1
Constructing
pad and roads
Locating well
pad
Drilling and
casing well
Controlling air
emissions
247 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "EPA Seeks More Information from Natural Gas Drilling
Operations to Ensure Safety of Wastewater Disposal (05/12/2011)"; Urbina, "Regulation Lax as Gas
Wells' Tainted Water Hits Rivers."
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Withdrawing
water
Disclosure of
chemicals
Preventing
and reporting
spills
Testing and
replacing
water supplies
Storing wastes
Disposing of
wastes
There are clearly many types of regulations that fall into each of these categories. For example,
in the category "locating well pad" the primary regulatory response across the different states
is a required setback. However, as described in the textual section on this stage earlier in the
chapter (called "Locating the Well Pad, Well, Pits, and Disposal Sites"), some states require
setbacks from drinking water resources, some from wetlands, and some from physical
structures. Most require setbacks from more than one of these (many require setbacks from all
three). Texas, however, only requires setbacks from physical structures. Yet all states receive a
checkmark in the relevant row in Table 1. In addition, some states specify which types of
drilling equipment, such as storage pits, pose especially high risks of contamination, and require
setbacks only for those features, or extra setbacks for those features. Setbacks can also be
specified in different types of schema; for example, Colorado and New York both employ a
graduated system of "buffer zones" in which various types of equipment are prohibited within
concentric radii from certain resources, such as public water supplies.
All of this is intended to highlight the point that states have an incredible diversity of
approaches when it comes to regulating shale gas development, and that diversity is not
reflected in Table 1. Table 1 does, however, illustrate that most states have at least some sort
of regulation on the books for most aspects of the shale gas development process.
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Chapter 4 - Enforcement of State Regulations
Introduction
Previous chapters described the wide array of federal and state regulations of shale gas
development that are currently in place. In order to develop a fuller understanding of how
these regulations impact the everyday business of shale gas operators, however, it is not
enough to simply look at the regulations that are on the books. Regulatory agencies and other
authorities have significant discretion regarding the application and enforcement of regulations
and it is only by analyzing enforcement practices that we can understand how regulations
influence and impact the practice of shale gas development. Regulations that appear to be
robust could have little impact on the ground if they are ignored by operators and regulators
while other regulations that may seem minor could shape development practices if they are
interpreted broadly and enforced robustly.2 49
As noted in previous chapters, shale gas development is primarily regulated at the state level.
Accordingly, this chapter will focus on developing a better understanding of how regulations
are implemented by the states. The chapter will focus on three key elements of regulatory
implementation: the capacity of states to enforce oil and gas regulations, data from the states
on violations they have detected and recorded, and information from the states about how
they have responded to these violations in terms of enforcement actions. 250
Enforcement Capacity
Perhaps the first step in a state's ability to enforce regulations governing shale gas
development is the capacity that it has to enforce the regulations on its books. "Capacity," as
defined here, consists of the number of field inspectors that a state regulatory agency has on
staff. Field inspectors are critical for an agency's ability to inspect sites, identify regulatory
violations, implement enforcement actions, and verify that the violation has been satisfactorily
addressed.2 s1
249 Wiseman, "Fracturing Regulation Applied," 369.
250 This organizational approach, as well as documentation of regulatory enforcement practices
pertaining to shale gas extraction, draws on an analysis performed by Hannah Wiseman in her white
paper: "State Enforcement of Shale Gas Development Regulations, Including Hydraulic Fracturing." The
white paper is part of a larger series published by the Energy Institute at the University of Texas at
Austin titled Fact-Based Regulation for Environmental Protection in Shale Gas Development.
251 Wiseman, "State Enforcement of Shale Gas Development Regulations, Including Hydraulic
Fracturing," 11.
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Table 2, shown below, summarizes the numbers of field inspectors employed by oil and gas
development regulatory agencies in a selection of states.2 s2
Table 2: Numbers of Field Inspectors, Agency-Wide and Assigned to Shale Gas Wells, 2008-
2011
CO LA MD MI MT NM ND OH OK PA TX WY
Total number of eld inspectors 17-22 125N
in agency 2008
NA 64" NA 27 6 16 NA NA
2009 NA 62 NA 25 7 16 NA 17-22 NA 357 NA
2010 NA 61 4 24 7 16 NA 17-22 438 76P NA
2011 12 59 4 22 7 16 11 26 NA NA 12 0&G
7 DEQQ
Of ol inspectors isled above, 27 16 NA NA NA
total nuner of inspectors
assigned to shale gas wells
200
431 NA
2009 4142 NA 25 16 NA NA NA
2010 4010 444 1 1 NA NA NA
2011 38r 446 1 1 NA NA 12"
Source: Wiseman, "State Enforcement of Shale Gas
Development Regulations, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 13.
As can be seen from the data in Table 2, regulatory capacity across the states varies
significantly, from four in Maryland to 125 in Texas. This variance can be attributed to a variety
of factors, including differences in how states report data,253 state budgets, agency priorities,
and political direction from policy makers.254 In addition to each of these factors, however,
Wiseman asserts that, "the number of staff employed [by regulatory agencies] is largely
influenced by the number of wells." 255 At the extremes, Maryland, with only four field
inspectors in 2011, had no hydraulically fractured wells as of July 2011 whereas Texas had
almost 16,000 wells in the Barnett Shale.256 This general correlation also applies to states
between these two extremes, and Pennsylvania, for example, has increased the number of field
inspectors employed as the number of wells drilled in the state has grown exponentially since
252 The data in the table are drawn from a variety of sources, including reports published by the agencies
themselves and by third parties, and from data obtained by Wiseman directly from agency
representatives.
253 For example, some states reported data for field inspectors across the agency while other reported
numbers for field inspectors dedicated to oil and gas operations. See Wiseman, "State Enforcement of
Shale Gas Development Regulations, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," notes 40, 41, 44.
254 Wiseman, "Fracturing Regulation Applied," 371.
255 Ibid.
256 Ibid.; Railroad Commission of Texas, Newark, East (Barnett Shale) Well Count 1993 Through July 19,
2012.
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shale gas development first began in 2008.257 Of course, in addition to looking at the raw
numbers of inspectors in different states, it can be valuable to look at the ratio of inspectors to
the number of wells and also to the number of inspections that have been carried out. Table 3
provides data on the number of wells drilled in selected states and Table 4 provides data on the
number of field inspections carried out.
Table 3: Numbers of Wells Drilled, 2008-2011
CO1A MD Mil M NMO ND" OH OK PAP TX WY"
0 308 19P wdNd 10,148med Shele
2009 0 153 76? websddMe 13,74P Bamell abel 25wokscompletedin
2010 0 120 116websdOe 1,8 mSo aiS 2009-1 1pedadti
2011 0 72 1,7513web dried 15870r Bame f Shie
t. NI .
Source: Wiseman, "State Enforcement of Shale Gas Development
Regulations, including Hydraulic Fracturing," 12-13.
Table 4: Numbers of Field Inspections Conducted, 2008-2011
CO LA MD Ml MT NM ND OH OK PA TX WY
Numberof field 13 11,013w 16 144 120,86
inspecions 2008 (Not (all oi and
spedn gas
to Ahale faciltles)
wels) 3
2009 186 13,459 16 323 2
2010 374 22 16,850 16 643 2
2011 363 0 4,396 16 298 2
Source: Wiseman, "State Enforcement of Shale Gas
Development Regulations, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 14.
The ratio of field inspectors to the number of wells drilled varies widely. For example, in 2008
Michigan had a ratio of 308 shale gas wells drilled to a staff of 27 field inspectors, meaning that
the state had a ratio of approximately 11 wells drilled for each field inspector on staff. In
contrast, in 2008 Texas had a ratio of 10,146 shale gas wells drilled to a staff of 125 field
inspectors, meaning that the state had a ratio of approximately 81 wells drilled for each field
inspector on staff. Differences in capacity, and how that capacity is utilized (and variances in
how data are reported) can also be seen in the number of field inspections that were
conducted in different states, in Table 4.
257 Wiseman, "Fracturing Regulation Applied," 371.
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Some commentators have documented the struggles that regulatory agencies face in keeping
up with the surge in drilling in recent years. 258 Pro Publica conducted a review of 32 oil and gas
producing states in 2009, documenting the number of wells drilled, the total number of wells,
the number of enforcement staff, and the number of enforcement actions in each state for
each year between 2003 and 2009.259 Although the early part of this time period predates the
spread of shale gas development beyond Texas, it is worth noting that, in most states, the rate
of well development far outpaced the number of enforcement staff added (if any were added
at all). In more recent years, Pennsylvania has significantly increased the number of staff
employed by the Department of Environmental Protection, including field staff dedicated to
inspections, while the Railroad Commission of Texas underwent a hiring freeze in 2009 and lost
both field personnel and attorneys to pursue legal enforcement actions for regulatory
violations. 260
Regulatory Violations
As described in previous chapters, shale gas development is a very complex process and is
governed by myriad regulations. As a result, violations of regulations can occur at many
different stages of the site development, drilling, and fracturing processes. This section will
provide an overview of findings on regulatory violations from various states where shale gas
development is proceeding.
The most commonly recorded regulatory violations include a variety of actions by well
operators, some of which seem to present immediate risks to public safety and the
environment and some of which do not. In a review of data from Louisiana, Michigan, New
Mexico, and Texas, the most common violations involved: "failures to obtain permits or submit
reports, failures to mow weeds around wellheads or post proper signs, improper construction
or maintenance of surface pits, and surface spills of various drilling materials." 262 Table 5
provides an overview of these results.
258 Abrahm Lustgarten, "State Oil and Gas Regulators Are Spread Too Thin to Do Their Jobs"; Mike
Soraghan, "Oil and Gas: Puny Fines, Scant Enforcement Leave Drilling Violators with Little to Fear."
259 Pro Publica, "How Big Is the Gas Drilling Regulatory Staff in Your State?".
260 Governor's Marcellus Shale Advisory Commission, Governor's Marcellus Shale Advisory Commission,
Final Report, 65-66; Wiseman, "State Enforcement of Shale Gas Development Regulations, Including
Hydraulic Fracturing," 6.
261 This section also includes information on New Mexico, where natural gas development is focused on
tight sands gas as opposed to shale gas. Although the exploration process is different for the two
sources of natural gas, the development process is very similar. See Shell, "Understanding Tight and
Shale Gas"; Matt Hall, "Shale vs Tight - Journal."
262 Wiseman, "Fracturing Regulation Applied," 373.
Chapter 4 - Enforcement of State Regulations 63
Table 5: Most Common Violations at Shale Gas and Tight Sands Sites by Percent of Total
Violations
Louisianar Michigan" New Mexico" Texas"
2009-2011 1999-2011 2000-2011 2008-2011
Permitting & 9.5% 0% 7.8% 32.3%
reporting
Pit construction 33.2 0.2 13 4.8
& maintenance 33.__. _ 1. 4.8
Signs & labeling 23.7 32.5 18.2 1.6
Site maintenance 0.9 22.4 0 0
Surface spill: 0.5 0.2 33.8 0
produced water
Surface spill: non-
produced water 3.3 24.5 5.2 0
or unidentified
substance
Source: Wiseman, "Fracturing Regulation Applied," 374.
As can be seen from Table 5, pit construction and maintenance and surface spills (of either
produced water or of other substances) are violations of potentially serious environmental
effects that were commonly reported in Louisiana, Michigan, and New Mexico. In Louisiana,
the most common pit- and storage-related violation documented was "failing to cover [the]
reserve pit." 263 Other common pit- and storage-related violations were for oil tank seal valves
that "are not equipped with the proper locking or sealing device" and for having storage units
for crude oil and produced water that are not properly segregated and could therefore pass
contents from one to the other.2 64
Surface spills of produced water and of other substances can also be a cause for significant
concern. Incidents in Michigan all involved spills of unknown fluids that contaminated soil,
usually at the wellhead.265 Records document that spills in New Mexico are due to a variety of
reasons, including frozen valves, overflowing tanks, and "human error." 266 Intriguingly, New
Mexico's records often document how much fluid is released in a spill and how much is
263 Hannah Wiseman and Molly Wurzer, "Louisiana Violations and Enforcements." See, e.g., Permit no.
239471.
264 Ibid at Permit Nos. 238345, 240287.
265 Hannah Wiseman and Jeremy Schepers, "Michigan, New Mexico, and Wyoming Violations and
Enforcements."
266 Ibid at Permit no. 30-039-25478, Incident no. nBP0918932635; Permit no. 30-039-25947, Incident no.
nDGF0100955815; Permit no. 30-039-25430; nDGF0605554027.
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recovered; for example, in one case a freeze led to the spill of 120 barrels of produced water, of
which only 10 barrels were recovered.
Michigan's many "site maintenance" violations almost all are for uncleared "vegetation" and
"objects on site" within 75 feet of the wellhead, or wellhead and tanks, or other equipment.26 8
Violations for assorted signs and labeling-related violations are very common in Louisiana,
Michigan, and New Mexico. Across all three states, these violations were generally for either
improper identification or no identification at the well site and tank battery or a lack of warning
signs, among other assorted causes.26 9
The bulk of documented violations in Texas pertain to "permitting and reporting." The
violations consisted of failures to secure required permits before drilling or fracturing wells,
failure to obtain approval of surface casing programs, and "failures to submit completion
reports-which provide data about how the well was drilled and fractured and the formations
encountered during the process-within ninety days of completing a well." 270
Finally, Pennsylvania deserves special focus as the state has produced the most violations of
state oil and gas laws at shale gas sites. Between March 1, 2012 and July 31, 2012 (a five-
month period after Pennsylvania passed Act 13),271 the Department of Environmental
Protection conducted 5,170 inspections of 2,744 unconventional well sites (including routine
inspections, drilling/alteration inspections, complaint inspections, incident inspections
(responding to an accident or event), and follow-up inspections).27 2 One hundred forty-nine of
these inspections found a total of 315 violations (many incidents violated multiple of the
Commonwealth's regulations). Records cite a wide variety of actions that violated regulations,
including:
failure to tag a well,273
267 Ibid, at Permit no. 30-039-25435, Incident no. nBP0701751207.
268 Ibid, see, for example, Permit no. 46116.
269 Hannah Wiseman and Molly Wurzer, "Louisiana Violations and Enforcements"; Hannah Wiseman and
Jeremy Schepers, "Michigan, New Mexico, and Wyoming Violations and Enforcements."
270 Hannah Wiseman, "Texas Violations and Enforcements"; Wiseman, "Fracturing Regulation Applied,"
375.
m Some provisions of the Act went into effect upon signing on February 14, 2012 while others went into
effect two months later on April 14, 2012. See Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, "Act 13 of 2012."
m PA Department of Environmental Protection, "Office of Oil and Gas Management Compliance Report
(Query Range: 03/01/2012 to 07/31/12)."
273 Ibid, Well permit 115-20637, violation #641247, June 7, 2012.
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e release of 4 to 6 barrels of synthetic oil-based muds (drilling fluids) due to operator
negligence,27 4
e unsafe venting of gas, 7 5
e leaking of hazardous materials from a surface pit,276
e failure to follow proper procedures during construction of well pad and access roads,
including erosion-control procedures,277
e failure to report a spill,278
e spillage of brine that evaded containment structures, flowed off the well pad, and
entered surface waters,2 79
e contamination of groundwater resulting in a groundwater sample with elevated
concentrations of barium, iron, manganese, chloride and bromide, 280
e spillage of an oil-based emulsifier resulting from a puncture from a forklift; this site also
had holes in the secondary containment structure, 28 1
e failure to report defective, insufficient, or improperly cemented casing within 24 hours
or to submit a plan to correct the problem within 30 days,282
* discharge of 25 gallons of drilling mud into a landowner's field,283
e spillage of production fluids into a creek and wetlands,284
e spillage of 20 gallons of flowback fluids due to a disconnected hose as the fluids were
being transferred into a truck for transport to a disposal site,285
e failure to plug a well upon abandonment. 28 6
It should be noted that most, but not all, of the incidents summarized here received a formal
Notice of Violation from the Department of Environmental Protection, particularly in cases
where the violation was immediately remediated.
Stepping back from individual regulatory violations, there is significant variance among states
around what types of violations most commonly are reported in state records, as can be
274 lbid, Well permit 115-20802, violation #637616, April 19, 2012.
27s Ibid, Well permit 115-20873, violation #644586, July 12, 2012.
276 lbid, Well permit 117-21148, violation #642082, June 11, 2012.
Ibid, Well permit 081-20877, violation #636054, April 2, 2012.
278 Ibid, Well permit 105-21722, violation #636634, April 9, 2012.
279 lbid, Well permit 081-20763, violation #644956, July 24, 2012.
280 Ibid, Well permit 015-20081, violation #640800, June 4, 2012.
281 Ibid, Well permit 115-20805, violation #642641, June 21, 2012.
282 lbid, Well permit 031-25404, violation #638187, April 19, 2012.
283 Ibid, Well permit 015-22058, violation #636663, April 10, 2012.
284 lbid, Well permit 115-20191, violation #642390, June 19, 2012.
285 Ibid, Well permit 115-20568, violation #644426, July 19, 2012.
286 ibid, Well permit 047-24478, violation #637149, April 9, 2012.
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observed in Table 5. Wiseman suggests a number of possible reasons for this sort of variance,
including the types of operators that are active in a given state (assuming, for example, that
larger operators with more experience cause fewer violations), climate and other local factors
(assuming, for example, that wetter states have more surface water to contaminate and more
precipitation that can cause pits to overflow), and different areas of focus and enforcement
capabilities among agencies, skewed date (in this case, many of the records for New Mexico
were drawn from the state's "Spills" database and Texas only reports violations that lead to
enforcement actions).2 87 It should be noted here that, both in the four states included in Table
5, and also in sample of violations from Pennsylvania, the violations were largely "easy to
detect." 288 That is, violations like spills, overgrowth of vegetation, and signage errors are all
readily detectible from a quick visit to a site. The documented violations do not contain many
mentions of regulatory violations that are more difficult to detect, such as air contamination
and groundwater contamination. This may be because these sorts of violation occur less
frequently, or it may be that regulatory agencies are not detecting these violations at
present.289
Enforcement Actions
After regulatory agencies find an operator in violation of regulations, they can choose what sort
of enforcement mechanism to pursue in order to promote compliance. As in the recording of
violations noted in the previous section, states display a significant diversity of approaches
towards enforcing regulations that are on their books.
To provide a brief illustration of the divergent approaches that states take to enforcing their oil
and gas regulations, Table 6 provides data on the number of recorded violations, enforcement
actions, fines/penalties, and the amount fined, for a sample of seven states.290 This data is for
all oil and gas drilling in these states during 2009 and therefore provides a broader perspective
on variance in oil and gas enforcement that is not restricted to shale gas.
287 Wiseman, "Fracturing Regulation Applied," 377; Wiseman, "State Enforcement of Shale Gas
Development Regulations, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 25.
288 Wiseman, "Fracturing Regulation Applied," 377, 378.
289 ibid., 377.
290 Although Greenwire does not cite data sources for its violation and enforcement data, as noted in
previous sections of this chapter, states record and report data in diverse formats with definitions that
may not align. For example, the data sources for the number of violations in Oklahoma and Texas may
define "violations" differently, which may explain why the number of violations in Texas is an order of
magnitude larger than the number in Oklahoma. Similar caveats apply to other data points in this table.
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Table 6: Oil and Gas Drilling Enforcement Data, 2009
Violations
Enforcement Actions
Fines / Penalties
Amount Fined
Percent of violations
that receive
enforcement actions
Percent of violations
that receive fines or
other penalties
Average amount of
fine
260
9
$168,000
$18,667
984
922
213
$170,000
94%
22%
$798
-kO
51
6
$45,000
00
0*
8,475
176
81
$451,977
3,361
678
122
$1,683,054
2%
1%
$7,500
20%
4%
$5,580 $13,796
Data Source: Greenwire, "Oil and Gas Drilling Enforcement Data, by State."
As can be seen from the data in Table 6, states take very different approaches to dealing with
violations of their own oil and gas regulations. For example, in 2009 Louisiana pursued almost
all of the documented violations with some sort of enforcement action and meted fines for
over 20 percent of violations. In contrast, Oklahoma and Texas pursued enforcement actions
and fines against a very small number of violations (in all cases, less than 5 percent of
violations). For violations that received fines, the average dollar amount of the fine also varied
dramatically, from less than $1,000 in Louisiana to over $18,000 in Colorado.
Another image of enforcement behavior is provided by Table 7, which shows a sampling of the
violations identified for each regulatory category in each of the four sample states as well as the
most severe penalty meted out for each category of violation.
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80,000
3,200
379
$2,273,825
4%
0%
$6,000
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Table 7: Enforcement Actions: Examples of Violations and Penalties
Louisiana
Failure to obtain
work permit be-
fore completing
well, file com-
pletion report,
etc.
Agreed order,
$1000 1
High levels of
arsenic, sele-
nium, etc. at
reserve pit clo-
sure
Admin. order to
take appropriate
remedial ac-
tion"
I Michigan
Violations noted
No known en-
forcement from
data provided
Violations noted
No known en-
forcement from
data provided
New Mexico
Failure to obtain
permit to pro-
duce and
transport gas
Agreed order,
$23,500
Water above
liner in pit
Agreed order.
$5000"
Texas
Failure to obtain
permit before
drilling well
Agreed order,
$14,500"''
Apparent failure
to properly de-
water, backfill
reserve pit
Agreed order,
$1000)I
Signs & improper LD. of Violations noted Failure to dis- No violations
labeling well site and play well sign identified
tank battery No known en-
forcement from Agreed order,
Admin. order to data provided $10W0
post correct
,109
sign
Site mainte- No violations Violations noted No violations No violations
nance identified identified identified
No known en-
forcement from
data provided
Surface spill: Salt water load Violations noted Spills of 15, 30, No violations
produced line from pro- 60 barrels identified
water duction facility No known en-
left open forcement from e.g. notices of
data provided, violation'
Admin. order to
report clean-up
methods
Surface spill: No violations Violations noted Small leak of Improper dis-
unidentified identified unidentified posal violation
substance No known en- substance that required
forcement from spill clean-up
data provided. e.g. phone call"
Agreed order,
remediation and
$15,000
Source: Wiseman, "Fracturing Regulations Applied," 3 79-380.
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Pit construc-
tion &
maintenance
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Table 7 illustrates that, generally, the states took minimal enforcement action in response to
the most common types of violations (the categories here are the same categories as in Table 5,
above), save for violations of permitting and reporting regulations.
Returning to the same data set for Pennsylvania discussed in the Regulatory Violations section,
above, 5,170 well inspections over a five-month period in 2012 yielded 315 violations. 29 1 Of
these 315 violations, the state took enforcement actions against 80 of them. Of these 80
enforcement actions, in all except for 4 cases the Department of Environmental Protection
issued a Notice of Violation. A Notice of Violation creates a formal record that an operator has
been cited for violating one or more of the Commonwealth's laws or regulations, but comes
with no additional consequences. These 4 remaining cases all received a Consent Assessment
of Civil Penalty (CACP). Under a CACP, the operator and the Department of Environmental
Protection enter into an agreement by which the operator agrees to wrongdoing and to pay the
agreed-upon restitution amount. Three of these four penalties were for $500 and the fourth
was for $1,500.292 Three of the four CACP enforcement actions were for operators failing to
submit well records within 30 days of the completion of drilling (yielding $500 CACPs) and the
fourth was for the operator's failure to have a drillers log on site at the time of inspection
(yielding the $1,500 CACP).
It should be noted that, aside from the five-month period from March to July, 2012,
Pennsylvania has instituted fines against operators for larger amounts of money in some high-
profile cases. For example, the Department of Environmental Protection reached an agreement
with Cabot Oil and Gas Corp. by which the company paid $4.1 million to residents in Dimock, PA
whose water supplies were contaminated by natural gas. 293 In this case, the settlement
specified that the $4.1 million be paid directly to 19 affected families while the Department of
Environmental Protection received $500,000 to offset the costs of its investigation into the
situation. 9 4 Other notable penalties include a combined fine of over $1 million levied against
Chesapeake Energy in May 2011 for contamination of well water for 16 families due to
improper well casing and cementing (resulting in a $900,000 fine) and an incident in which
three condensate separator tanks caught fire due to improper handling and management of
condensate (resulting in a fine of $188,000).29s In addition to the monetary penalties levied,
291 PA Department of Environmental Protection, "Office of Oil and Gas Management Compliance Report
(Query Range: 03/01/2012 to 07/31/12)."
292 [bid, Well permit 005-30826, violation #636225, April 6, 2012; Well permit 105-21728, violation
#635038, March 19, 2012; Well permit 105-21728, violation #635039, March 19, 2012; Well permit 003-
22197, violation #636224, April 6, 2012.
293 Laura Legere, "DEP Drops Dimock Waterline Plans; Cabot Agrees to Pay $4.1M to Residents."
294 Ibid.
295
25PA Department of Environmental Protection, "DEP Fines Chesapeake Energy More Than $1 Million."
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the Department of Environmental Protection also reached agreements with the operator by
which the latter would have to remediate damage done and change its operating procedures in
the future in order to avoid similar incidents. As part of the Consent Order and Agreement for
the well contamination case, Chesapeake agreed to, "take multiple measures to prevent future
shallow formation gas migration, including creating a plan to be approved by DEP that outlines
corrective actions for the wells in question; remediating the contaminated water supplies;
installing necessary equipment; and reporting water supply complaints to DEP." 296 The Consent
Order and Agreement for the tank fires, "Chesapeake must submit for approval to the
department a Condensate Management Plan for each well site that may produce
condensate."2 97 In February of 2012, Chesapeake Energy was fined $565,000 by the
Department of Environmental Protection for multiple violations, including release of flowback
water and other fluids into a stream, damage to wetlands, and erosion into a stream classified
as "high-quality." 298
Overall, the data indicate that regulatory agencies in the states reviewed generally take
enforcement actions for detected violations in a minority of cases (often a small minority of
cases) and, of these enforcement actions, most are similar to Pennsylvania's Notices of
Violation-the violation is officially recorded and the operator is required to remedy the
violation. Only a very small number of violations receive more significant enforcement
responses, whether fines, mandatory remediation, a temporary cease-work order, suspension
of general operations within a limited geographic area, revocation of operating license, or
requirements to adopt different operating procedures in the future. Another conclusion that
can be drawn from the information in Table 7 is that regulatory authorities in the four states
generally meted out larger fines for violations of permitting and reporting regulations than for
the other categories of common violations, including pit construction and maintenance and
spills. This finding aligns with the regulatory information available from Pennsylvania for the
period March 1, 2012 to July 31, 2012, when the four fines imposed by the Department of
Environmental Protection were for failures to submit well records and to have a drillers log on
site at the time of inspection.
The approach to enforcement taken by the states can be explained by a number of possible
factors. To begin, it seems that many states employ a graduated enforcement system for
violations of oil and gas regulations. In this kind of system, detected violations are generally
handled first through "informal" enforcement mechanisms, and in case these procedures do
not work, authorities will progress to "formal" enforcement mechanisms. For example,
296 ibid.
297 ibid.
298 Scott Detrow, "Chesapeake Fined $565,000 For Violations."
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Michigan has a "standardized compliance and enforcement program" that is designed to
"ensure predictable, reliable, and efficient escalated enforcement actions." 299 Michigan's
program generally, but not in all cases, proceeds through the following stages:
1. Issuance of a Notice of Noncompliance (NONC), which allows the permittee 30 days to
voluntarily resolve the violation;
2. Issuance of second Notice of Noncompliance (NONC);
3. Issuance of a Notice of Referral, informing the permittee that the violations have been
referred to the Compliance and Enforcement Unit;
4. The Compliance and Enforcement Unit issues a Notice of Violation (NOV), which must
be resolved through a formal administrative, civil, or criminal process;
a. The Administrative Process can either be resolved through voluntary compliance
by the permittee (e.g. through a voluntary consent agreement) or through an
Administrative Hearings Process;
b. The Civil Process often includes violations "that involve permittees that are
located outside Michigan, those that involve cost recovery, or those that involve
failure to comply with administrative orders or agreements" and cases are heard
in circuit court before a judge;
c. The Criminal Process is for cases that appear to involve criminal intent and may
be heard before a judge or a jury.30o
Similarly, both Colorado and Florida have graduated compliance and enforcement programs in
which regulatory agencies afford the operator the opportunity (and perhaps multiple
opportunities, as in Michigan) to voluntarily bring their operation into compliance with
regulations before proceeding with formal enforcement mechanisms. 3 01 The Florida
Department of Environmental Protection explains that the preference for compliance through
informal mechanisms is mutually beneficial for the operator and for the agency:
Compliance without enforcement benefits both the Department and the violator.
Effective compliance assistance is less costly for the Department than legal proceedings,
and the violator typically spends more of its resources towards resolving or preventing
environmental damage rather than defending itself in a legal action.302
299 Michigan Dept of Environmental Quality, Office of Oil, Gas, and Minerals, "Compliance and
Enforcement Fact Sheet."
300 Ibid.
301 Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission, "General Users Guide to the COGCC Hearing Process";
Florida Department of Environmental Protection, "Enforcement Manual 12 (Revised Dec. 2004)."
302 Florida Department of Environmental Protection, "Enforcement Manual 12 (Revised Dec. 2004)."
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Given the data described above, it seems possible that many other states take this sort of
compliance-oriented approach in which operators are given the opportunity to voluntarily
rectify a noncompliant situation and bring their operations into compliance.
Different states and political administrations may also have varying political motivations for
identifying violations and taking enforcement action. Shale gas development has created jobs
and economic development, including in parts of the country, such as Appalachia, where these
resources are particularly wanting. Regulatory agencies, which sit in the executive branch of
state government, may receive instructions from the governor of the state to follow a particular
regulatory approach. For example, the percentage of violations that received enforcement
actions were significantly lower during the first few months of the Corbett administration in
Pennsylvania than they were than during an equivalent period of time one year earlier, under
the previous administration. A study by a group called Citizens for Pennsylvania's Future
analyzed Department of Environmental Protection data and found that, during the first quarter
of 2011, once Governor Corbett came to power, there was one enforcement action for every
8.69 violations, whereas one year earlier, under Governor Rendell, there was one enforcement
action for every 1.7 violations. 303 The Corbett administration also released a directive - which
was subsequently rescinded - requiring field inspectors to get approval from department
administrators before issuing Notices of Violation to Marcellus Shale drilling operations.304 On
the other hand, state officials in Pennsylvania have noted that PA Act 13, passed in February
2012, gives the Department of Environmental Protection greater enforcement powers than it
previously had, including a tripling of the maximum civil penalties that the agency can impose
and giving the agency the ability to revoke permits of drillers with repeat violations.30 In
addition, in the press release from the Department of Environmental Protection announcing
the $1.9 million fine of Chesapeake Energy for the water well contamination and the tank fire,
described above, Secretary Krancer is quoted as saying: "The water well contamination fine is
the largest single penalty DEP has ever assessed against an oil and gas operator, and the Avella
tank fire penalty is the highest we could assess under the Oil and Gas Act. Our message to
drillers and to the public is clear." 306 Overall, it seems clear that a regulatory agency, either
independently or under political direction, can strategically decide how it will pursue its
responsibilities to enforce state regulations.
As noted above, violations and enforcement data indicate that states may be more aggressive
in applying and enforcing regulations requiring operators to secure permits and report on their
303 Don Hopey, "Shale Drilling Fines Drop Under Corbett."
304 Ibid.
305 Timothy Puko, "Fines Against Drillers in Pa. down 70 Percent."
306 PA Department of Environmental Protection, "DEP Fines Chesapeake Energy More Than $1 Million."
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activities than they are around other types of regulations, such as pit construction and
maintenance and spill prevention and remediation. There are a couple of possible reasons why
some states may be more commonly and aggressively enforcing permitting and reporting
regulations than other types of regulations. One factor may be that, if an operator does not
secure a permit for a well, a regulatory agency cannot perform its other responsibilities with
regards to that well. That is, when an operator applies for permits and submits reports about
the various stages of development, the regulatory agency is put on notice about the well's
existence and what actions the operator is taking (for example, a well completion report
informs the agency that the operator has finished the completion process and is moving on to
extraction).307 This information allows the regulator to perform both its environmental and
health protection duties and also its oil and gas conservation duties.308 As such, regulators may
enforce permitting and reporting regulations more aggressively than many other types of
regulations because the former are prerequisites for carrying out the agency's mandate. A
second possible factor may be that some agencies place a higher priority on carrying out their
oil and gas conservation mandates than they do on carrying out their environmental and public
safety mandates.309 While the permitting and reporting regulations are critical for both
conservation and environmental protections purposes, most of the other regulations (e.g. air
pollution, pit integrity, spill control, etc.) serve only the latter of these two purposes. As such,
some agencies may be focusing on enforcing the permitting and reporting regulations because
these are the only ones that are critical for conservation purposes.
Another set of factors that could influence state agency's enforcement efforts have to do with
staffing. Particularly as state budgets have come under increasing pressure in recent years, just
as the shale gas boom has taken off, agencies may not have the resources to hire sufficient
numbers of field inspectors and other officials (such as lawyers) to pursue enforcement actions.
Wiseman goes so far as to postulate that, "inadequate staffing [may be] the primary reason for
low levels of enforcement."310 One striking example is Texas, where even as conventional and
shale drilling have boomed in recent years, the Railroad Commission of Texas underwent a
hiring freeze in 2009 and lost personnel. The agency's chief geologist reported that "Legal
307 Wiseman, "Fracturing Regulation Applied," note 119.
308 As described in Chapter 2, due to the history of oil and gas regulation in which regulation was initially
intended to "conserve" oil and gas resources and regulations for environmental protection were added
in the second half of the twentieth century, many regulatory agencies (often known as "conservation
commissions" or "corporation commissions") play a dual role of promoting oil and gas development and
protecting environmental resources and human health.
309 Wiseman, "Fracturing Regulation Applied," 382.
310 Hannah Wiseman, "Questions Re: Shale Gas Regulation (personal correspondence with author)."
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Enforcement was down to attorneys and field operations was also short of personnel."m With
312
a smaller staff, Texas pursued only 5 enforcement actions at fractured well sites in 2010. As
noted above, a study by Pro Publica found that the growth in wells significantly outpaced the
growth in inspection capacity between 2003 and 2009 in most states, and the study also found
that this led to a decrease in the percentage of wells inspected in most states and a drop in
enforcement actions in some states. 3 A second staffing issue agencies that could impact on
enforcement activity is the question of whether field staff, in particular, are adequately trained.
Wiseman suggests that, in some cases, "inspectors may be inadequately trained to detect
certain environmental violations... specific training regarding oil and gas inspections and the
potential effects to look for likely... is necessary."31 4 West Virginia and Pennsylvania both have
some sort of requirement in place by which (some) inspectors must have experience in the
industry.31 s State geologists in Pennsylvania testified that they "are not familiar with
requirements to look at how the operation might affect nearby streams." 316 Both staffing levels
and lack of proper expertise among staff may be contributing factors to the low enforcement
levels seen in many states.
Finally, there are a number of other factors that could also influence enforcement levels. A
2009 legal judgment in New Mexico, for example, found that the state's regulatory agency, the
Oil Conservation Commission, does not have the authority to issue civil penalties for
environmental violations and must ask the Attorney General's Office to do so. 317 As this case
illustrates, some regulatory agencies may be limited in the enforcement tools that they have at
their disposal (the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission can still issue notices of violation
and enter into compliance orders with operators) and which could influence the types of
enforcement actions that agencies pursue. Other factors that could influence enforcement
levels and outcomes include: "whether site visits are conducted routinely or primarily in
response to complaints; whether advance warning of inspections is provided... and whether
industry best practices tend to vary between regions."318
311 Wiseman, "State Enforcement of Shale Gas Development Regulations, Including Hydraulic
Fracturing," note 7.
31 Wiseman, "Fracturing Regulation Applied," 372.
313 Abrahm Lustgarten, "State Oil and Gas Regulators Are Spread Too Thin to Do Their Jobs."
314 Hannah Wiseman, "Questions Re: Shale Gas Regulation (personal Correspondence with Author)."
315 Mike Soraghan, "Oil and Gas: Drilling Regulators Pull Double Duty as Industry Promoters." Soraghan
actually cites the requirement not as a positive attribute but rather as a factor that promotes regulatory
capture.
316 Mike Soraghan, "Oil and Gas: Protecting Oil from Water -- the History of State Regulation."
31 Wiseman, "Fracturing Regulation Applied," 378-379.
318 Ibid., 373.
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Conclusion
Written regulations provide only a partial image of regulatory practice; in order to see the
whole picture, it is necessary to look at how regulations are applied and enforced. This chapter
reviews regulatory enforcement data to understand how state regulators interpret the law and
apply the enforcement tools at their disposal for purposes of protecting public health, safety,
and environmental quality. The data that are available are limited. Nevertheless, the
composite picture that begins to emerge is that most state regulatory agencies are struggling to
catch up with the drilling and production boom, and this is occurring in an era of fiscal austerity
and lean government budgets. The types of violations that are detected, as reflected in state
records, very from state to state and most would be observable from a visual site inspection or
a review of paperwork (as opposed to regulatory violations that occur underground or involve
air emissions, which are more difficult to observe). Most states employ what might be called a
"cooperative regulatory model" in which regulators work closely with shale gas operators to
bring them into compliance with the law. Most violations initially receive no formal sanction;
instead, operators are given a chance to remedy the violation and bring their operation into
compliance without incurring any sort of penalty. In most states, a very small percentage of
recorded violations receive a fine or involve some other enforcement action beyond a basic
citation of noncompliance. Regulatory authorities are far more likely to issue a fine for
violations of permitting and reporting requirements than for spills or blowouts - events that
present a more immediate threat to public safety and health and to environmental quality.
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Chapter 5 - Regulatory Federalism
Introduction
Previous chapters have documented both federal and state regulation of shale gas
development as well as how states, which exercise the vast majority of regulatory authority at
present, apply and enforce regulations. As shale gas development - with "fracking" often used
as shorthand - has gained public prominence in recent years, a number of commentators have
raised questions about the adequacy of current regulations and whether the current regulatory
structure is robust enough to safeguard public health and safety and protect the environment.
In particular, some commentators have called for the federal government to take the lead and
set a baseline level of regulation to provide minimal protections in all jurisdictions. 319
The National Institute of Standards and Technology, a Federal agency located within the U.S.
Department of Commerce, articulates the purpose of government regulations as follows:
The U.S. Federal regulatory system is designed to protect and improve the health,
safety, and well being of U.S. citizens and to protect the environment. It seeks to
improve the performance of the economy without imposing unacceptable or
unreasonable costs on society.320
In other words, the government (although this quotation is specific to the federal government,
the principles apply equally to the states) regulates certain activities in order to protect public
and environmental wellbeing but seeks to do so in a way that does not impose unnecessary
costs. That is, regulators seek to strike a balance between the public benefits derived from
regulation and the public costs imposed by regulation.32' Efficient regulations are generally
those in which the benefits derived from the regulation meet or exceed the costs imposed by
the regulation.
The purpose of this chapter is to define and apply a set of evaluative criteria to determine
which level of government - the states or the federal government - is better able to protect the
public welfare in a way that does not impose unnecessary costs. This analysis is driven by an
attempt to identify which level of government, state or federal, is best suited to regulate, not
by what the regulations should be. That is, it is presumed that once the level of government
that is best suited to create and enforce regulations is identified, the appropriate government
319 See, for example, Freeman, "The Wise Way to Regulate Hydraulic Fracturing."
320 National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Regulations."
m It should be noted that while this approach of balancing costs and benefits applies to most regulatory
activities, policy makers have specifically exempted some regulations, such as the federal Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), from evaluation under a benefit-cost test. See W. E. Oates, "A
Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism," 15.
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bodies will then decide how to strike an optimal balance between the benefits and costs of
regulation.
The evaluative criteria that will guide this analysis are of two kinds: the first set are "level-
neutral" in the sense that they will be applied to evaluate whether both state and federal
governments would be capable of evaluating shale gas development and whether one entity or
the other would be better to undertake such regulation. This first set of criteria consists of:
e Geographic distribution of costs and benefits,
e Regulatory capacity,
e Innovation, flexibility, and adaptability in regulation,
e Efficiency, certainty, and stability in regulation.
Application of this first set of criteria will find that states are better suited to regulate most,
although not all, aspects of shale gas development (as the states already do).
In addition to this first set of criteria, a second set will analyze two specific questions that would
indicate "regulatory failure" on the part of state regulators and would consequently compel the
federal government to step in and assume regulatory authority from the states (as described in
previous chapters, states currently hold the vast majority of regulatory authority as pertains to
shale gas development). If either of these two latter criteria are found to be "true" or in effect,
then at least some portions of regulatory authority currently held by states should be taken
over by the federal government. This second set of criteria consists of:
e Is competition among the states to attract capital investment for economic growth
causing downward pressure on regulations such that federal intervention is required to
set a national regulatory floor?
* Is regulatory capture of state agencies occurring such that federal intervention is
required to set a national regulatory floor?
Although answers to these questions cannot be definitively given, the affirmative evidence for
both of these questions is not compelling enough to necessitate federal assumption of
regulatory authority from the states.
After defining each of the criteria, this chapter will examine each of these six criteria in turn and
will reach the conclusion that regulatory authority over shale gas development is, in most cases,
best left with the states.
Definition of the Criteria
The evaluative criteria will be briefly explained here before exploring how they apply to the
current practice of shale gas development in the United States.
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Geographic distribution of costs and benefits
The applicable principle is that regulation should be conducted by the lowest level of
government that geographically encompasses the costs and benefits associated with the
regulated activity. The reasoning behind this principle is that the jurisdiction of government
that best matches the geographic distribution of costs and benefits will be best able to decide
on the appropriate balance between the costs and benefits. Under this criterion, federal
regulation would be needed when the costs or benefits of the regulated activity are felt largely
across state lines. m
Regulatory capacity
The regulatory entity should possess the capacity to regulate the activity in question. While
capacity consists of various components, including financial and human resources,
management capacity, and organizational infrastructure, among others, the critical
consideration here pertains to technical know-how. While a regulatory agency may require
additional financial resources to carry out its mandate, for example, or may require some time
to build out its management capacity, responsible agencies should already possess technical
know-how and expertise in regulating areas that are similar to shale gas in terms of the types of
technical capacities (e.g. risk analysis, modeling, geologic expertise, etc.) that are required.
Innovation, flexibility, and adaptability in regulation
This criterion seeks to assess how well a regulatory entity or entities would experiment with
new regulatory approaches, or allow for such experimentation, in order to yield enhanced
policy and regulation. A key component of this criterion is the regulatory entity's ability to be
flexible and adaptable to changing circumstances as shale gas development continues to evolve
in practice and as science and public opinion about shale gas continue to evolve.
Efficiency, certainty, and stability in regulation
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, regulatory action by state and federal governments
generally seeks to balance the benefits derived from regulation against the costs imposed by
regulation and to make sure that the associated benefits are greater than equal to the costs. A
key cost of regulation is the burden that it imposes on business, particularly business actors
associated with the regulated industry. This criterion seeks to assess how well a regulatory
entity or entities would be able to create and enforce regulations efficiently, in order to
minimize the burden on the regulated entities, and how effectively the regulatory entity could
create regulatory stability and certainty (as uncertainty and changing regulations can impose
322 Wallace E. Oates, "Industrial Ecology," 14.
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significant costs on businesses as they are forced to hedge against potential changes as well as
invest resources in changing their operations in response to regulatory changes).
Competition among the states causing downward pressure on regulations?
Some commentators have argued that states that are competing against each other to attract a
limited pool of capital investment may weaken regulations in an effort to reduce the cost of
doing business in order to attract business investment and thereby foster economic growth.m
This phenomenon, in which each state is seeking to lower imposed regulatory costs to a lower
level than businesses encounter in other states, is commonly known as a "race to the bottom."
Under this criterion, federal regulation would be needed if multiple states are weakening their
regulations in order to compete with each other to attract business investment.
Regulatory capture of state agencies?
Some commentators have also argued that the risk of regulatory capture is greater at the state
level than at the federal level because there is typically less policy transparency and less press
attention to policy at the state level and it can be more difficult for pro-regulatory interests to
achieve the critical mass necessary to successfully advocate for stronger regulations at the state
level. 2 Under this criterion, federal regulation would be needed when there is a high risk of
regulatory capture at the state level, or when regulatory capture of state regulators has already
occurred.
Primary Criteria Applied to Shale Gas Development
This section will take the four primary criteria introduced in the previous section and apply
them to the contemporary practice of shale gas development in order to determine whether
states or the federal government is better suited to regulate this industry.
Geographic Distribution of Costs and Benefits
The first criterion pertains to the geographic scope of benefits and costs resulting from the
regulated activity. In a system in which voters elect representatives to create policy on their
behalf, such as exists in the United States, the level of government whose jurisdiction best
corresponds to the geographic spread of benefits and costs will have the greatest incentive and
ability to strike a balance between those benefits and costs that reflects the preferences of the
people who experience the benefits and costs - the voters. This principle is known as
subsidiarity. As will be described here, most of the costs and benefits of shale gas development
323 See, for example, Stewart, "Pyramids of Sacrifice?", and Engel, "State Environmental Standard-
Setting."324 See, for example, Stewart, "Pyramids of Sacrifice?", and Caminker, "State Sovereignty and
Subordinacy."
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are experienced at the local level, thereby indicating that state governments would more
faithfully represent the regulatory preferences of the affected populations than would the
federal government.3 2 s In addition, those costs that cross state lines, such as air pollution and
contamination of navigable waterways, are already regulated by existing federal authority.
Oates presents a typology of three cases, which are defined by the geographic distribution of
externalities created by the regulated activity.326 In Oates' model, the appropriate regulatory
authority - national government or sub-national government - is the one that can best balance
the costs and benefits associated with the regulated activity.
Oates' first case is one in which the environmental impact is felt at a national, or even global,
scale with no impacts that are direct or exclusive to the local area in which the externality-
causing activity is taking place. Examples of this sort of "pure public" impact are greenhouse
gas emissions that contribute to climate change and chlorofluorocarbons that contribute to
ozone depletion. Neither of these examples involves an immediate impact on the area from
which the emission occurs (although an indirect impact due to global warming or ozone
depletion may clearly impact the local area), and the impact is encountered globally.328 Local
governments are ill-equipped to balance the costs and benefits of the regulated activity
because the benefits are (likely) garnered locally while the costs are spread globally. Indeed,
even national governments are not ideally equipped to deal with these sort of global impacts
for similar reasons, which would be best handled with a truly global solution.
Oates' second case is one in which the environmental impact is felt exclusively at a local scale
with no impacts that spread beyond a defined sub-national boundary.329 Examples of this sort
of "pure local" impact are contamination of local drinking water and the local disposal of waste
325 If the costs (including groundwater contamination, traffic, noise and light pollution, habitat, etc.) and
the benefits (including revenues from mineral leases, employment, etc.) of shale gas development are
largely experienced at the local level, it could be argued that local regulation would be better than state
regulation. Indeed, one could imagine a scenario in which a state's electorate under-regulated shale gas
development because the costs were borne disproportionately by a small portion of the state's
population while the statewide population benefitted from secondary economic effects and a healthier
state budget. While some states (particularly Texas) allow for local regulation, states have traditionally
held regulatory authority over oil and gas development and questions would need to be resolved about
whether all but the largest municipalities (such as Fort Worth, Texas) would have the technical,
managerial, and financial wherewithal to regulate the oil and gas industry.
326 W. E. Oates, "A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism," 2-5.
327 Ibid., 2-3.
328 Ibid., 3.
329 Ibid., 3-4.
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that was created locally.330 The smallest jurisdiction of government that best aligns with the
geographic distribution of costs and benefits associated with the regulated activity would be
best able to balance the relevant costs and benefits, and therefore would be best able to set its
appropriate standard for environmental quality.331
Oates' third case involves a pollutant that has both local effects in the jurisdiction in question as
well as effects that spill over the jurisdictional boundary into neighboring (or, perhaps farther
away) jurisdictions.33 Examples of this sort of "local with spillover" impact are air or water
pollution that flows out of the jurisdiction in which it was created and into other jurisdictions.333
In these sorts of situations, local regulation is unlikely to take into account the externalities that
flow beyond the local jurisdiction's boundaries (because the decision-makers are not directly
accountable to the people who bear those impacts), thereby suggesting that regulation by a
larger (perhaps national) jurisdiction would lead to better outcomes. 334
Turning to shale gas development, most of the benefits and costs of the practice are
experienced at the local, or perhaps regional, level. On the benefits side, revenues from
mineral leases, jobs that are created, and economic development that results from the shale
gas industry all largely accrue to the local area where extraction is occurring. On the costs side,
most of the concerns that are raised by shale gas development also largely impact the local
population. For example, most issues concerning water supply impact local aquifers or surface
water sources, and water supply issues have traditionally been a state concern.335 Conflicts
around access to water are typically between local users and even interstate conflicts (for
example, in the Southwest) have generally been handled by interstate compacts. 336 Adverse
impacts from construction of well pads and access roads as well as drilling and extraction
activity, including noise, traffic, lighting, impacts on habitat, and visual impact, are all local
impacts. Contamination, whether of land, surface water, or groundwater, due to spills,
leakages, or blowouts is generally localized in area and falls under the jurisdiction of state
governments.337
330 ibid., 4.
331 Ibid.
332 Ibid., 4-5.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 5. Oates notes that the ideal intervention in these situations is not self-evident and that the
first-best outcome is unlikely to be a uniform national standard for environmental quality.
33s Spence, "Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production," 33.
336 Ibid.
3 For example, the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act over stormwater flows and discharges to surface
waters is limited to "navigable" waterways and adjacent wetlands. The focus of the Safe Drinking Water
Act is on public water systems with only a "community information" approach offered for source water
protection (such as groundwater sources). On the other hand, under RCRA and CERCLA, the handling,
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There are some externalities imposed by shale gas development that clearly have impacts
beyond state borders, and there are areas of shale gas development that the federal
government already regulates. For example, air emissions, including methane and volatile
organic compounds most notably, are not a local concern. Rather, because gases can easily
travel beyond the local area and across state boundaries, air emissions are a cause for national
concern (and even international concern, due to methane's contribution to climate change).
The Clean Air Act gives the federal government jurisdiction to regulate air emissions, as
described in Chapter 2. A second area of federal involvement in shale gas development is in
wastewater disposal. Particularly the two most common methods of disposal, via publicly-
owned treatment works (POTWs) and underground injection control wells, wastewater disposal
is regulated under the Clean Water Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act.
Beyond the geographic distribution of costs and benefits, shale gas development does work
differently in different states. States have enacted regulations that reflect these differences in
geology and environmental conditions, which themselves create different cost and benefit
structures in different states. For example, the development process in any two shales (for
example, Michigan's Antrim Shale compared to Texas' Barnett Shale) differs significantly.338 To
take just one example, during the fracturing process, all shales return both flowback and
produced water, but quantities returned differ significantly. In some shales, the combined
flowback-plus-produced-water quantity returned is significantly less than the amount of water
inserted, and in some shales, the amount returned is more than the amount inserted.
Furthermore, the composition of the water returned to the surface in terms of the naturally-
occurring chemicals contained therein and the quantities of the chemicals will differ
significantly from one shale to another, and therefore, from one state to another.339 These
differences create significantly different operating conditions for shale gas companies in terms
of their considerations around reuse and disposal of wastewaters and creates significantly
different risk factors for the states that regulate operations.
disposal, and remediation of hazardous substances and spills of hazardous substances has been defined
as a federal responsibility, perhaps due to the exceptional nature of the handling and remediation
procedures that are required for hazardous waste sites, and the significant resources that are required,
but as described in Chapter 2, oil and natural gas have largely been exempted from these two pieces of
legislation, putting regulatory responsibility back on the states.
3 Wiseman, "State Enforcement of Shale Gas Development Regulations, Including Hydraulic
Fracturing," note 52.
339 Tom Hayes, "Characterization of Marcellus and Barnett Shale Flowback Waters and Technology
Development for Water Reuse."
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Different environmental conditions in the different states where shale gas development is
occurring also create different risk structures and thereby change the nature of the costs and
benefits that state regulators face. For example, while operators in states such as Texas and
Oklahoma have typically stored various materials (such as fracturing fluids, drilling fluids, waste
waters, etc.) in surface pits, these same pits present different risks for operators and
communities in states such as Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and New York due to the higher
precipitation levels in the Marcellus states.340 Greater rainfall can make surface pits more
susceptible to overflowing, thereby necessitating different operating procedures and
regulations. New York, for example, has proposed only allowing storage tanks, not pits, in its
proposed regulations.341 Another example of local environmental conditions influencing
operating conditions, risk factors, and therefore regulations can be seen in Louisiana, which
specifies a number of regulations governing how pits must be constructed in wetland areas,
regulations on the use of marsh buggies to protect stream bottoms and water bottoms, and
sequestration of wetland drilling sites using either dikes or impervious decking with curbs,
gutters, and/or sumps. 3 4 2 All of these regulations seem to be driven by a need to tailor
operating procedures to the unique environment of the bayou. These examples demonstrate
that environmental conditions shape the practice of shale gas development in different states,
thereby also impacting the costs and benefits attendant to shale gas that states must take into
consideration as they create and enforce regulations.
It is worth noting here that, in the areas where the federal government does have regulatory
authority, it has been active in trying to diagnose and understand the evolving risks presented
by shale gas development and respond accordingly. For example, as described in Chapter 2, the
EPA has expanded regulations under the Clean Air Act to capture emissions of volatile organic
compounds and is actively considering how to best regulate the disposal of diesel fuels in
underground injection control wells. 3 4 3 The EPA is also studying the risks presented to drinking
water and groundwater by hydraulic fracturing over the full lifespan of the process, from initial
acquisition of water to final disposal.344 The Environmental Protection Agency has also been
active in encouraging compliance to federal regulations by states that have gained primacy to
enforce those regulations. A particularly high profile example was the public back-and-forth
340 Weston, "Water and Wastewater Issues in Conducting Operations in a Shale Play - The Appalachian
Basin Experience," 59.
341N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining
Regulatory Program," 7-34.
342 LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 76: 1., § 301 (B)(5), (E), (F), (Q); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33:V, §.1121.
3 US EPA, "Oil and Natural Gas Air Pollution Standards"; US EPA, "Permitting Guidance for Oil and Gas
Hydraulic Fracturing Activities Using Diesel Fuels - Draft: Underground Injection Control Program
Guidance #84."
344 US EPA, "EPA's Study of Hydraulic Fracturing and its Potential Impact on Drinking Water Resources."
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between the EPA and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PA DEP) in
which the EPA questioned PA DEP on whether operators were adequately pre-treating
wastewater before sending it to publicly owned treatment works (POTWs) for final disposal and
whether the state was adequately monitoring discharges from the POTWs into waterways.3 4 s
This is an example of EPA ensuring that Pennsylvania, which has primacy to enforce Clean
Water Act regulations, enforces those regulations adequately. Wiseman reports that, although
a public exchange of this nature between the EPA and a state administration is rare, it is not
unusual for the agency to provide direction to states that have primacy in their enforcement
efforts.3 46
In summary, the majority of costs and benefits associated with shale gas development are
contained within the boundaries of the states where shale gas development is occurring.
Furthermore, each state confronts a unique set of costs and benefits because the nature of
shale gas development differs somewhat from state to state, as highlighted above by examples
stemming from geology and the local environment. According to the subsidiarity principle, the
nature of the geographic distribution of costs and benefits argues in favor of allowing states to
regulate most negative externalities of shale gas development because they are better able to
strike a balance between costs and benefits that represents the interests of their constituents.
Finally, those aspects of shale gas development that do involve spillover effects into other
states are already regulated by the federal government.
Regulatory Capacity
The second criterion requires that the regulatory entity possess the capacity needed to regulate
the activity in question. Capacity can be of various sorts, of course. A primary concern relates
to the possession of technical know-how and expertise in regulating areas that are similar to
shale gas in terms of the types of technical capacities (e.g. risk analysis, modeling, geologic
expertise, etc.) that are required. Other types of capacity that are important include knowledge
about local conditions and financial and human resource capacity.
The federal government, particularly in the form of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
and state regulatory agencies both possess the requisite technical capacities to regulate shale
gas development. EPA has extensive experience regulating a wide variety of activity that
require similar types of technical know-how as regulation of shale gas development requires,
34s Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 127.
346 Hannah Wiseman, "Questions Re: Shale Gas Regulation (personal Correspondence with Author)."
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including mining and drilling, activities that create air emissions and that can contaminate
surface water and groundwater, and handling and disposal of hazardous wastes.347
State regulatory agencies also possess the technical capacity required to regulate shale gas
development. Rabe, for example, describes the significant expansion of regulatory capacity
that states have undertaken since the 1970s.348 For example, Rabe details the reforms in
governance that state governments have undergone, including enacting new constitutions,
expanded taxing powers, expanding and professionalizing state bureaucracies and political
staffs, and becoming more democratic and responsive to citizen concerns. 349 Today, the states
exercise significant authority and autonomy in environmental regulation, issuing the vast
majority of permits and carrying out most enforcement actions. 350 States' responsibilities
include, in the vast majority of states, responsibility for implementation of federal
environmental regulations under the primacy doctrine.3s1 States have been regulating the oil
and gas industries for over a hundred years and the responsible agencies have developed
expertise in this highly technical area during that time.35 2
Both the federal government and state regulatory agencies have also demonstrated their
regulatory capabilities in their ongoing responsiveness and adaptation to shale gas
development in recent years. The federal EPA has, among other actions, promulgated new
regulations limiting release of volatile organic compounds from shale gas wells and pushed
Pennsylvania to enforce compliance with Clean Water Act regulations pertaining to water that
is discharged from wastewater treatment plants. 35 3 State regulatory agencies have responded
to the particular risks presented by shale gas development, enacting new regulations that
require disclosure of the chemicals constituents of fracturing fluids, strengthening well casing
requirements to accommodate the high pressure associated with high-volume hydraulic
fracturing, and increasing required setbacks from domestic and natural resources, among other
innovations. On the enforcement side, states are inspecting well sites, noting violations,
requiring that operators bring operations into compliance, and, in some cases, taking
347 See, for example, US EPA, "Water: Pollution Prevention & Control"; US EPA, "Air Pollutants I Air and
Radiation"; US EPA, "Superfund I US EPA."
348 Barry G. Rabe, "Power to the States: The Promise and Pitfalls of Decentralization," 34-42.
349 ibid., 34.
350 Ibid., 34-35.
3si ibid., 35.
352 Ground Water Protection Council, State Oil and Natural Gas Regulations Designed to Protect Water
Resources, 13-15.
3s3 Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, including Hydraulic Fracturing," 127;
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enforcement actions such as issuing administrative orders, entering into consent orders, and
imposing penalties.
Beyond technical know-how, there are a couple of other areas of capacity that are worth
noting. One area in which states trump federal regulators is knowledge of local conditions. As
described in section above on the geographic distribution of costs and benefits, local geology
and the environment shape both the practice of shale gas development and the necessary
regulatory response. State regulatory agencies have a better understanding of the local
conditions in which shale gas development occurs and can therefore better adapt regulations
to fit these conditions. A second capacity issue relates to financial and human resources. The
section on regulatory capacity in Chapter 4 references the struggle that most state regulatory
agencies have had in keeping pace with the explosive growth in drilling in recent years.354
Although some states, particularly Pennsylvania, have taken steps to increase staffing levels,
most states continue to grapple with a significant shortfall in regulatory staff, perhaps partially
attributable to the lean budgets that states have been working with in recent years. Finally a
third capacity issue pertains to research and development. State governments and their
regulatory agencies generally make scant investment in research and development, and Rabe
reports that, "each year the federal government outspends the states in environmental
research and development by more than twenty to one, and states have shown little inclination
to assume this burden by funding research programs tailored to their particular technological
and research needs." 355 While states have conducted, and are conducting, some research
focused on shale gas, such as the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality's air emissions
monitoring study in the Barnett Shale, the bulk of research is being conducted at the federal
level (such as the EPA's study on groundwater impacts).356
Both the federal government and state regulatory agencies possess the core technical
capacities that are required to regulate shale gas development. The states, however, have
much more extensive experience regulating oil and gas development and understand the local
conditions in which drilling is taking place better than the federal government is likely able to.
While there are a couple of areas in which state agencies are lagging, particularly staffing
capacity and research capacity, the policy recommendations in Chapter 6 suggest strategies to
3s4 Abrahm Lustgarten, "State Oil and Gas Regulators Are Spread Too Thin to Do Their Jobs"; Mike
Soraghan, "Oil and Gas: Puny Fines, Scant Enforcement Leave Drilling Violators with Little to Fear"; Pro
Publica, "How Big Is the Gas Drilling Regulatory Staff in Your State?".
3ss Barry G. Rabe, "Power to the States: The Promise and Pitfalls of Decentralization," 45.
356 Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, "Barnett Shale Emissions"; US EPA, "EPA's Study of
Hydraulic Fracturing and Its Potential Impact on Drinking Water Resources."
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address these issues. Overall, the states possess more of the needed capacities to regulate
shale gas development.
Innovation, Flexibility, and Adaptability of Regulations
The third criteria seeks to assess how effectively regulatory agencies have and continue to
adapt to the evolving circumstances around shale gas development through innovative policies
and flexible approaches that meet the diverse needs of concerned populations. A key element
of shale gas development today is that widespread development of this resource is still
relatively novel. The development process itself continues to evolve and, as described above, is
often tailored to local geography and environmental conditions. In addition, much about the
process remains unknown. Particularly relevant to this paper is that both the nature and
magnitude of the risks associated with shale gas are still being explored and studied by science.
The ability for regulatory approaches to evolve in concert with the evolving practice of, and
scientific knowledge about, is critical for the effectiveness of regulatory practice.
The federal environmental laws of the 1970s broke new ground for government regulation in
many respects, although they also built on top of and succeeded some state and local laws that
were already in effect and regulated, for example, local air pollution.3 s7 Since this time, as
states have enhanced their capacity for governance, generally, and regulation, specifically,
some (and definitely not all) states have taken a leadership role in creating new approaches to
improve environmental outcomes. Rabe describes the significant initiative that some states
have shown in pioneering creative new approaches to environmental regulation. For example,
he describes how some states are shifting their regulatory strategy from one of pollution
control to one of pollution prevention.358 Minnesota, for example, employs a performance-
based approach in which emitting firms are required to submit annual toxic pollution
prevention plans in contrast to the technology-mandate approach of much federal
regulation. 35 9 Rabe also describes how some states have taken steps to reconceptualize how
they approach the classification of environmental problems and seek a more integrative
approach that minimizes leakages of pollution across mediums (e.g. air quality, water quality,
waste management, etc.) as well as cutting down on net environmental damage.360 States have
also pioneered the use of economic incentives to meet environmental goals with, for example,
the experiments in a number of states with emissions trading programs laying the groundwork
for the federal government to adopt a national trading program in sulfur allowances as part of
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. 361
357 W. E. Oates, "A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism," 12-13.
358 Barry G. Rabe, "Power to the States: The Promise and Pitfalls of Decentralization," 37-38.
359 ibid., 38.
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The virtues of a federalist system in promoting innovation and experimentation were famously
articulated by Justice Louis Brandeis in 1932:
There must be power in the States and the Nation to remould, through
experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and
economic needs.... It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." 362
In the shale gas arena, there is some evidence that states, and even the federal government,
are already drawing from one another's experiences and drawing on regulatory best practices.
For example, Chapter 10 of New York State's Revised Draft SGEIS (which articulates a
framework for draft regulations) is titled "Review of Selected Non-Routine Incidents in
Pennsylvania" and is a review of a number of accidents, spills, and regulatory failures that
Pennsylvania has encountered with shale gas development and a description of mitigation
measures that are contained in New York's draft regulations that would address similar
occurrences in New York.363 In another example, the Environmental Protection Agency
modeled its regulations controlling emissions of volatile organic compounds partially on
regulations in place in Colorado and Wyoming.3 64 Many states have also voluntarily submitted
their regulatory programs (either their oil and gas programs in their entirety, a more limited
review of provisions directly applicable to hydraulic fracturing, or both) for review by an
organization called the State Review of Oil & Natural Gas Environmental Regulations, Inc., or
"STRONGER. STRONGER is a nonprofit, multi-stakeholder organization, composed of
representatives of industry, environmental groups, and regulatory officials, that has developed
guidelines for state regulations around waste handling and disposal and groundwater
protection.366 Both submission of one's regulatory program, and implementation of
STRONGER's recommendations, is voluntary. As illustrated here, dissemination of regulatory
approaches and best practices can occur both horizontally (i.e. between states) and vertically
(between states and the federal government).
Regulation by the states of shale gas development has yielded varying approaches to both
written regulations and enforcement approaches. As described here, states are experimenting
362 Ibid.
363 N.Y. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, "Revised Draft SGEIS on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining
Regulatory Program," chap. 10.
3" Wiseman and Gradijan, "Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing," 75.
365 STRONGER, Inc., "Formation of STRONGER."
366 STRONGER, Inc., "Who We Are."
Chapter 5 - Regulatory Federalism 89
with new approaches and are learning from each other, and as described above, states have
adapted to their local geological and environmental conditions to create different, individually
appropriate, balances between the benefits and costs of regulation. These considerations
regarding innovation, flexibility, and adaptability of regulations argues in favor of allowing
states to maintain primary regulatory authority.
Efficiency, Certainty, and Stability of Regulations
A key cost imposed by regulatory action is the burden that it imposes on business, particularly
business actors associated with the regulated industry. This fourth criterion seeks to assess
two, related issue. First, it seeks to assess how well a regulatory entity or entities would be
able to create and enforce regulations efficiently, in order to minimize the regulatory burden on
the regulated entities. Second, it seeks to assess, how effectively the regulatory entity or
entities could create regulatory stability and certainty. These qualities of regulatory stability
and certainty are important for many actors associated with the regulated activity, but are
particularly important for businesses that are engaged in the activity because changing
regulations and uncertainty about the nature of future regulations can impose significant costs
on businesses as they are forced to hedge against potential changes as well as invest resources
in changing their operations in response to regulatory changes. This section will first address
regulatory efficiency and will then address regulatory stability and certainty.
Most, though not all, regulations will impose a cost on business activity and, generally, policy
makers and regulators attempt to balance the benefits derived from regulating an economic
activity against the costs imposed by that regulation such that the costs do not exceed the
benefits. Regulatory efficiency helps to keep down he costs imposed by regulation. Latin
explains that, in the realm of environmental regulation, an example of a measure that strives
for greater efficiency while maintaining identical environmental outcomes is the setting of a
performance standard to meet a specified emissions-reduction target and allowing the
regulated entities to determine the least-cost strategy to meet that target.367 In contrast to a
regulatory requirement that operators use a specific emissions-control technology, allowing
operators to choose their preferred strategies and technologies to meet emissions-reductions
targets will allow them to decide if the technology that would otherwise be mandated is the
lowest-cost option to meet the emissions-reduction requirement or if there are lower-cost
options available.
As described in the section on innovation, above, Rabe recounts how states have been at the
forefront of measures to incorporate economic incentives into environmental regulation and to
integrate regulatory efforts across media (which can greatly increase efficiency by, for example,
367 Latin, "Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency," 1268-1270.
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asking businesses to comply with one set of factory-wide standards or requirements as
opposed to complying with multiple and possibly overlapping requirements for water
emissions, air emissions, solid waste disposal, etc.).368 Anderson describes how state
governments are able to manage forestlands more efficiently than the federal government and
Schoenbrod argues that state governments are able to clean up contaminated waste sites far
more cheaply and efficiently than can the federal government. 369 It should be recognized, of
course, that more efficient (and less costly) regulation can be achieved not only by finding
better, less onerous ways to meet standards but also by lowering standards.
When it comes to shale gas regulation, the states reviewed have taken a variety of approaches
to promoting regulatory efficiency. Texas, for example, keeps an updated record of how long it
takes to process and receive a drilling permit; at the time of writing, the state would grant an
expedited permit in 7 business days and a standard permit in 14 business days.370 The faster
that permits are granted, the less time that companies have to keep resources idle, thereby
saving money. All of the states that require disclosure of hydraulic fracturing chemicals,
although only after fracturing has been completed, are acknowledging that requiring disclosure
of chemicals that will be used prior to fracturing would impose regulatory inefficiency on shale
gas operators since they often change the composition of the fluid as the learn more about the
geology of the well while the drilling and fracturing process is occurring.7
It should be noted here that one argument that is sometimes made for regulatory efficiency
calls for the federal government to implement uniform national standards in order to preempt
the varied standards that can be set by the fifty states. Klass explains that this regulatory
approach is usually applied to "nationwide products" (such as energy efficiency standards for
appliances, or other types of regulations for automobiles, drugs, medical devices, etc.) so that
manufacturers are not forced to choose between customizing products for each state or
choosing only a subset of states for which to manufacture products.372 Klass also notes that the
approach taken by the federal government in these types of situations is not one of "regulatory
federalism" in which the federal government sets either a regulatory floor or ceiling and allows
states to enact stricter (in case of a floor) or more lenient standards (in case of a ceiling). 3
368 Barry G. Rabe, "Power to the States: The Promise and Pitfalls of Decentralization," 38-40.
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Rather, federal regulation preempts state and local regulations in these circumstances. 374 This
type of approach is not required for regulation of shale gas development, however, because
although operators do encounter different regulatory regimes in different states, the operators
are not selling an otherwise standardized product to customers in different states and, even if
regulations were to be standardized across the states, operators would still need to adapt
operations in different states to differences in geology and local environment. Furthermore,
the author is not aware of any calls for national regulation made by operators, indicating that
operators likely do not perceive regulatory heterogeneity to be a significant cause of
inefficiency and costs.
Another key concern for business is that they operate under a regime that offers regulatory
certainty and stability. These qualities are important for businesses because changing
regulations and uncertainty about the nature of future regulations can impose significant costs
on businesses as they are forced to hedge against potential changes as well as invest resources
in adapting their operations in response to regulatory changes. Although this author did not
locate literature that spoke directly to the question of whether federal or state regulatory
agencies provide greater regulatory stability and certainty, some inferences drawn from the
literatures on federal bureaucracy and regulatory capture may assist in answering this question.
Wilson makes the case that federal government agencies function more effectively when they
are given more autonomy by policy makers and when they face less public scrutiny and
pressure to conform to public expectations. 375 Although Wilson does not contrast performance
or behavior of federal and state agencies, Caminker and Spence argue that state agencies
generally face lower levels of public scrutiny and public pressure due to lesser media attention
376
and lower levels of political organizing at the state level to push policy priorities. As a result,
it could be argued that, all else being equal, state regulatory agencies do enjoy comparatively
more autonomy than do federal regulatory agencies. With this greater level of autonomy, it
can be inferred that state agencies would be subject to fewer of the external pressures that
limit autonomy and that cause significant shifts in regulatory policy and would thereby be more
likely to offer greater regulatory stability and certainty than do federal regulatory agencies.
Turning to regulation of shale gas development, examples of the pressure exerted on federal
regulatory agencies, such as the EPA, can be seen in the many exemptions that have been
granted to oil and gas development and to hydraulic fracturing from federal statutes such as
3 Ibid.
115 Wilson, Bureaucracy.
3 Caminker, "State Sovereignty and Subordinacy," note 44; Spence, "Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and
the Political Economy of Energy Production," 25.
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the Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). As was
described in Chapter 2, Congress first directed the Environmental Protection Agency to study
whether oil and gas wastes should be covered under RCRA in 1980. After almost a decade of
foot-dragging, the EPA finally adopted Congress' position and declared RCRA regulation of oil
and gas wastes to be "unwarranted" in 1988.m At the state level, the transition from the
Rendell to the Corbett gubernatorial administrations provides an example of an apparent shift
in regulatory policy, with a significantly smaller proportion of violations resulting in
enforcement actions under the new administration than under the old one. 378 While there are
likely numerous examples of shifts in regulatory policy and strategy that could be cited at both
the federal and the state levels, the reasoning articulated above regarding the lower levels of
interest-group pressure and public scrutiny that apply to state regulatory activities creates a
presumption in favor of greater autonomy and therefore greater regulatory stability and
certainty at the state level than at the federal level.
Although a more complete analysis would need to be conducted, particularly in the area of
regulatory stability at the state level, it generally seems to be the case that states offer both
greater regulatory efficiency and probably offer greater regulatory stability than does the
federal government. This, then, is another argument for giving primary regulatory authority
over shale gas development to the states.
Secondary Criteria Applied to Shale Gas Development
In addition to the four criteria explored above - geographic distribution of costs and benefits;
regulatory capacity; innovation, flexibility, and adaptability; and efficiency, certainty, and
stability - there are two questions that would indicate regulatory failure on the part of the
states and would thereby compel the federal government to step in and assume regulatory
authority. If either of these two latter criteria - competitive downward pressure on regulations
and regulatory capture - are found to be "true" or in effect, then at least some portions of
regulatory authority currently held by states should be taken over by the federal government.
Competition among the states causing downward pressure on regulations?
Some commentators have argued that states that are competing against each other to attract a
limited pool of capital investment may weaken regulations and lower taxes in an effort to
reduce the cost of doing business in order to attract business investment and thereby foster
Wiseman, "Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia," 245-246. While this particular change in
regulatory behavior is "industry-friendly" in that it exempts the oil and gas industry from a class of
federal regulation, there can also be regulatory changes that impose greater regulatory burdens on
industry and the general principle, of changeability in regulations, nevertheless applies.
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economic growth. In this type of scenario, commonly known as a "race to the bottom," states
would fail to regulate an activity sufficiently and/or to lower taxes not because each would
independently choose not to, but rather that, faced with the threat of some states lowering
their regulatory standards or taxes in order to attract a limited pool of investment capital that
would lead to jobs and economic growth, other states are compelled to lower their own
standards and taxes in order to compete effectively for that same capital investment.379 In this
sort of scenario, the federal government would step in to resolve the "prisoner's dilemma" of
state competition by imposing an optimal level of regulation itself.
A vigorous debate about whether a "race to the bottom" exists, and the magnitude of its
effects if it does exist, has raged for over thirty years. On one hand, Stewart has argued, as
early as 1977, that the mobility of industry presents a risk to any individual state or community
that seeks to adopt high environmental standards because the resultant flight of capital to
other jurisdictions with lower standards can lead to a loss of welfare that outweighs the gains
from the higher standards. 380 According to this logic, then, even if policy makers are assumed
to act perfectly rationally (and are not myopic in discounting the welfare loss caused by
environmental pollution that will be felt in the future, for example), they still have an incentive
to lower their regulations to match those in the jurisdiction that regulates least stringently. On
the other hand, Revesz has countered the "race to the bottom" argument by positing that
states likely relax environmental standards not because they are caught in a "prisoner's
dilemma" that compels them to relax their standards to compete for investment, but rather
because they are expressing a policy preference to weight economic development more heavily
when striking a balance between the costs and benefits of regulation.38' That is, these states
(and their voting public) place a comparatively higher priority on economic development than
they do on environmental protection than do more heavily-regulated states and, furthermore,
this choice is a legitimate policy preference that should be respected.382
In addition the theoretical argument about whether competition among states causes
downward pressure on regulations, some scholars have studied the issue empirically. For
example, Goklany documents that municipalities and states around the country enacted
regulations that led to real, measurable improvements in air quality even before the passage of
federal regulation controlling air emissions in the 1960s and culminating in the passage of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.383 Goklany asserts that, contrary to the logic of the race to
379 Spence, "Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production," 22.
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the bottom, local jurisdictions were tackling the problem of air pollution well before the federal
government decided to act.3 8 4 Grossman has documented that some states have enacted more
stringent regulations on pesticide use than required under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act and Lennett and Greer have shown that states have introduced tighter
regulations on the disposal of hazardous wastes than required under the federal Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act.38s In both cases, the fact that states have sought to enact
stricter regulations than required by the federal government would seem to argue against the
existence of a race to the bottom, at least as applies to the circumstances particular to these
states and their regulations. Another historically-focused approach employed by three
different studies analyzed agency behavior and environmental performance by state regulatory
agencies after the Reagan Administration implemented a wide-ranging decentralization of
environmental decision making; none of these three studies found that states engaged in
behavior that would accord with there being a race to the bottom. 386 Shifting from direct study
of regulatory agency behavior to an analysis of the behavior of private firms, a meta-analysis by
Jeppeson, et. al. of eleven studies that analyzed the location decisions of manufacturing plants
and other pollution-intensive industries found mixed results, with some studies finding that
firms tend to locate in areas with laxer air quality regulations while other studies found no such
correlation.387 Finally, and perhaps critically, one study found that 88 percent of state
environmental officials attested that concerns about industry location and siting affects
environmental decision-making in their state." 388 Summarizing this extensive body of empirical
research, the upshot seems to be that, while there is not much evidence to support idea that
states have lowered regulations in order to compete to attract industry and other capital
investment, the vast majority of state environmental officials attest that concern about driving
away industry does impact their state's own policies and regulations.
It is improbable that competition amongst the states to attract shale gas development is
creating downward pressure on state regulations, although the evidence does seem to support
the idea that state decision-makers, both political and regulatory, may be moderating the
severity of environmental and public health regulations and other costs that are imposed on
the gas industry. As argued by Revesz, this behavior seems to accord with a policy choice that
(most) states are making to strike a balance between shale gas development and
384 Ibid.
38 Grossman, "Environmental Federalism in Agriculture: The Case of Pesticide Regulation in the United
States"; Lennett, "State regulation of hazardous waste."
386 List and Gerking, "Regulatory Federalism and Environmental Protection in the United States";
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environmental and health protection that ensures that gas development occurs. This behavior
does not appear to indicate that there is a regulatory "race to the bottom" occurring between
shale gas producing states. The regulatory approaches employed by Pennsylvania and New
York will be used as examples to support this interpretation.
Some states, such as Pennsylvania, clearly have concerns about implementing a regulatory
standard that would make it cost-prohibitive for shale gas companies to operate in the state
and thereby lose the jobs and economic development associated with shale gas development.
Governor Tom Corbett's administration has taken a number of steps to keep the cost of
operating in Pennsylvania low and thereby attract shale gas companies. For example, instead
of a severance tax, which most other states impose on operators, Pennsylvania opted to
introduce an impact fee in February 2012, as part of Act 13.389 While the mechanics of how the
tax and the fee are calculated differ somewhat, the relevant point here is that some analyses
have indicated that Pennsylvania will be charging the industry significantly less money than
many other states do. 390 Another aspect of Act 13 designed to hold down costs for operators
limits the ability of municipalities to control shale gas development through land use controls
such as zoning.391 Act 13 also introduced many of the more innovative and aggressive
environmental and health protections that can be seen across the current regulatory spectrum,
as noted in Chapter 3.
These aspects of Pennsylvania's legislative and regulatory approach as embodied in Act 13
highlight a couple of points with regards to the race to the bottom theory. First, from a
business perspective, regulations are significant not in and of themselves, but rather because
they increase the cost of operation. Taxes levied on companies also increase the cost of
operation. Although the focus of this paper is on regulation, Pennsylvania seems to be looking
at regulations and taxes/fees imposed on industry in tandem and seems to have struck an
implicit balance between implementing stronger environmental and health protections and
charging operators less than many other states in the form of fees and taxes. A second point is
that, although the Corbett Administration and its allies in the Pennsylvania General Assembly
that supported Act 13 are concerned about keeping costs imposed on operators in check, the
innovative and aggressive environmental and health protections introduced in Act 13 respond
to the concerns that many Pennsylvanians have about shale gas development. Act 13
represents Pennsylvania's attempt at balancing costs and benefits in a way that promotes the
economic benefits of shale gas development while mitigating some of the associated
environmental, health, and social costs. A third point is that Pennsylvania's actions likely do not
389 "What The New impact Fee Law, Act 13, Means For Pennsylvania."
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represent a step towards a regulatory race to the bottom. The cost of development in
Pennsylvania, after the passage of Act 13, may be higher or lower than in Arkansas, or any
other state, but this does not impact the amount of development that occurs in Pennsylvania
since shale gas operators possess sufficient capital to invest in development in both Arkansas
and Pennsylvania. In addition to the regulatory costs and taxes or fees that are imposed by the
government, development costs for shale gas (whether in Pennsylvania or any other state) are
also influenced by factors such as operational costs related to local geology and environmental
conditions, land and mineral lease costs, the presence and location of infrastructure such as gas
pipelines and roads, and local labor costs. Operators' decisions about whether to drill for shale
gas in Pennsylvania (or any other state) is primarily driven by how the cost of development (due
to the various factors cited here) compares to gas companies' expectations of profit from the
gas that they develop, not by whether regulatory costs are higher in one state than another.
Similarly, New York has not "lost out" on the opportunity to enjoy the economic benefits of
shale gas development due to its long-running moratorium on development. If, and when, New
York allows shale gas development to proceed, companies will evaluate the expected cost of
development in the state and determine whether it makes economic sense for them to
proceed. Like Pennsylvania, New York is seeking to balance the costs and benefits of shale gas
development in a way that will win the support of the majority of New York State's voters and,
based on New York's draft regulations, if appears that New York will enact stronger regulations
than Pennsylvania has done. This, too, will not necessarily preclude development of shale gas
resources in New York State. If operators determine that New York's regulations make
development there unaffordable at present, they will refrain from drilling now but will likely
move forward with drilling in the likely event that the market price for natural gas increases to
a point that covers the cost of operating in New York at some point in the future. All of this is
to say that the structure of natural gas development belies the race to the bottom rationale for
federal regulation.
With ample capital available for shale gas development and the costs imposed by regulatory
action comprising only one of myriad costs that operators face as they consider whether to drill
in any given state, the nature of shale gas development does not seem to accord with the
theory that states are competing with each other to attract finite capital investment by
reducing regulatory standards and taxes. Each state does strive to strike a balance between
reaping the benefits of shale gas development and mitigating its costs and so may decide on a
regulatory posture that is more or less stringent than other states. This decision-making
process seems to be more akin to the policy preference that Revesz describes than the race to
the bottom that Stewart describes. As a result, without compelling evidence that competition
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is driving down regulatory standards among the states, then, this criterion does not require that
the federal government step in to assumer regulatory authority over shale gas from the states.
Regulatory Capture
The second criterion that would require federal regulation, if it were to be found true, is one in
which state regulatory mechanisms are "captured" by the regulated industry and therefore do
not carry out regulatory responsibilities adequately. In a situation of this nature, federal
regulation would either supplant or place a floor below state regulation, thereby ensuring that
minimum regulatory standards are being met.
While capture could afflict regulatory agencies at the state or federal level, some
commentators have argued that regulatory capture is more likely to occur at the state level
than the federal level. Caminker posits that, while a concentrated industry interest clearly has
an interest in ensuring that a state has lax regulations, free rides and other collective action
obstacles can preclude a forceful and effective articulation of the public interest to argue for a
stronger regulatory approach.392 In these sorts of situations, when resources available to pro-
regulation interest groups at the state level may be limited, "diffuse pro-regulation interests
may be able to organize more easily at the national level, and hence national deliberations may
reflect a more "balanced" consideration of competing interests regarding a regulatory
regime."393 Another argument for greater susceptibility to regulatory capture at the state level
is summarized by Spence. In this second argument, state regulators are more susceptible to
political capture by the regulated industry than are federal regulators due to a lower level of
public scrutiny that is generally applied to decisions made at the state level than to decisions
made at the national level due to lower levels of media attention and lesser transparency of the
policy-making process at the state level.394
Some commentators have noted, and sharply criticized, the degree of overlap that exists
between state regulators of the oil and gas industries and members of those industries:
"Greenwire reviewed the backgrounds of 95 oil and gas commissioners, board members and
agency heads in the top 27 oil and gas states. Of those, 39 had an oil and gas background, or 41
percent."395 The same article proceeds to assert that this overlap between regulators and
those they regulate is a "problematic "revolving door"" that presents conflicts of interests - in
other words, symbolizes regulators that have been captured by the regulated industry.396 Some
commentators have similarly criticized the relatively small percentage of regulatory violations
392 Caminker, "State Sovereignty and Subordinacy," note 44.
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that prompt enforcement actions in most states and the small sizes of most of the fines that are
levied.397
These characteristics of regulatory practice in many states could be evidence of regulatory
capture - or it could be due to more legitimate reasons such as the necessity of having industry
insiders represented among regulatory officials due to the technical expertise that they
contribute and a regulatory strategy of working collaboratively, rather than confrontationally,
with industry. Enforcement data too could be a reflection of the cooperative regulatory
strategy that states generally employ and it could also be an artifact of the sharp increase in
drilling activity in recent years combined with budgetary constraints that state governments
face.
Ultimately, the author is unable to determine whether regulatory capture has occurred in
some, all, or none of the states. As is illustrated in Table 1, in Chapter 3, which summarizes the
presence of state regulation at each stage of the shale gas development process, almost all of
states reviewed in this paper have promulgated regulations covering almost all of the stages of
the shale gas development process. As noted, while some commentators have raised questions
about the presence of industry representatives amongst regulatory officials and have argued
that current enforcement practices are inadequate to protect public and environmental
wellbeing, these practices could be in place because of the regulatory strategy that states
employ - ultimately, a result of policy preference as opposed to regulatory capture.
Further research needs to be conducted on the question of capture, particularly when it comes
to regulatory enforcement by the states. The divergence between regulations, as they are
written, and regulations, as they are enforced, is striking and the causes of this divergence
merit investigation. Until such research is conducted, however, and the findings indicate that
industry has captured state regulatory agencies, the federal government should err on the side
of allowing the states to continue exercising primary regulatory authority, not least because of
the various arguments in favor of state regulation articulated above.
Conclusion
In the American federalist system, regulatory authority over shale gas development could be
exercised by either the federal government or the states. This analysis took a level-neutral
approach to ask whether, considering the particular characteristics of shale gas development
and the capacities and capabilities of federal environmental regulators and state environmental
397 Mike Soraghan, "Oil and Gas: Puny Fines, Scant Enforcement Leave Drilling Violators with Little to
Fear."
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regulators, the states or the federal government is better suited to exercise primary authority
over shale gas development.
This analysis finds that the states are better suited than is the federal government to regulate
shale gas development and that, consequently, primary regulatory authority should remain
with the states. In comparison to the federal government, the states are better suited to strike
a balance between the costs and benefits of shale gas development, the majority of which
occur within states borders; have greater technical capacity to regulate shale gas development;
are better at innovating and tailoring regulations to suit local circumstances and conditions; and
are most likely better at creating efficient regulations that also offer regulatory stability and
certainty.
In addition to this primary test, a secondary analysis was also conducted to assess whether two
common types of regulatory failure - a race to the bottom and regulatory capture - have
compromised state regulation of shale gas development and concluded that there is no
compelling evidence that either of these types of failure is occurring. As a result, the primary
analysis stands and the states should continue to exercise primary regulatory authority.
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
Introduction
This thesis has made the case that primary responsibility for regulating shale gas development
should be left in the hands of the states, as opposed to being transferred to the federal
government. Applying criteria derived from theories of regulatory federalism to the
contemporary practice and regulatory structure of shale gas development, this thesis has
argued that the states are better positioned than the federal government to serve as primary
regulators of shale gas. The states have a better understanding of the local context in which
the majority of costs and benefits of shale gas development are experienced, they have
superior capacity to regulate the industry, they are more likely to pursue innovative regulatory
approaches that better fit local contexts, and they are more likely to regulate efficiently and to
provide greater regulatory stability.
While primary regulatory authority should remain with the states, that is not equivalent to
arguing that the regulation of shale gas development should remain just as it is. The public
controversy about shale gas development highlights the many concerns that people have with
the process, and this thesis has touched upon a number of ongoing challenges that shale gas
development is creating for public and environmental wellbeing that are not fully addressed by
the current regulatory structure and approach. This chapter will introduce policy proposals that
both states and the federal government could adopt to better protect public health, safety, and
the environment.
Policy Recommendations for States
State policy-makers and regulators can take a couple of relatively simple steps, focusing on
building enforcement capacity and incentivizing shale gas operators to take greater
responsibility for potential negative externalities caused by their operations, to significantly
improve regulatory outcomes.
Use a portion of oil and gas revenues to support needed personnel expansion
Chapter 4 presented information about the gap that has opened in recent years between the
number of new wells that are drilled every year and the number of personnel that enforcement
agencies have on hand. Many agencies appear to be stretched to the limit in their efforts to
conduct field inspections of both existing and new wells. Texas, for one, has attributed a
decrease in enforcement actions starting in 2009 to a hiring freeze at the Railroad Commission
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398that took effect in 2008. State budgets have been constrained across the country due to
ongoing fiscal austerity.
Pennsylvania significantly increased the number of its field inspectors by using increased
revenues from permit fees. While some states rely on severance taxes and other revenue
streams from gas drilling to support general state expenses, some states might consider
instituting a small surcharge on current taxes and fees relating to oil and gas development to
support enhanced inspection and build their enforcement capacity. As presented in Chapter 5,
there does not appear to be a race to the bottom among states, so a marginal increase in fees
to support the hiring of needed personnel should not adversely impact gas industry operations.
Incentivize regulatory compliance by shifting greater liability onto industry
Chapter 4 also documented how many states seem to take a "compliance-oriented" approach
to regulatory enforcement in which operators that are found to be in violation are usually given
a chance, often multiple chances, to rectify the violation before penalties are imposed. The
exception to this general practice appears to involve violations of reporting and permit
requirements, where, sanctions are imposed much more readily. While there are a couple of
possible explanations for this practice (permitting and reporting being a prerequisite for other
regulation, a regulatory prioritization of conservation over environmental protection), from a
risk management perspective it seems counterintuitive. Actions and violations that endanger
environmental and public wellbeing, such as spills of hazardous materials, ought to result in
fines even if minor administrative violations do not. The lack of sanctions for serious violations
prompts the question of what incentive operators have to comply with environmental and
health regulations. As noted, inspection capacity in most states has not kept pace with
booming drilling and development activity. States cannot possibly inspect every well site under
their purview even once a year at current staffing levels. If operators know that inspections are
few and far between and that punishment is unlikely, it is worth inquiring how frequently
operators might be intentionally or unintentionally violating regulations.
Policy makers and regulators could consider shifting some of the liability associated with the
negative externalities of shale gas development, currently borne by society, back onto shale gas
operators. Pennsylvania's rebuttable presumption of operator responsibility for groundwater
contamination has served as an incentive for operators to conduct testing prior to drilling.39
Texas has increased penalties for operators that are cited for repeated violations.00 States
398 Wiseman, "State Enforcement of Shale Gas Development Regulations, Including Hydraulic
Fracturing," note 7.
399 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3218; 25 PA. CODE § 78.52.
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could consider emulating these measures from Pennsylvania and Texas, and adopting others,
that shift some of the liability and responsibility for safe and responsible behavior onto
operators and enhance the incentives facing them to comply with the law. For example, Fred
Krupp, of the Environmental Defense Fund, has suggested that states should implement
"compliance schemes where companies certify they have done it right and there are severe
penalties if they perjure."401
Policy Recommendations for the Federal Government
While this thesis argues against a significantly enhanced federal regulatory role given the
superior suitability of the states for primary regulatory authority, the federal government
should focus on those areas where it has a comparative advantage and can add significant
value. For example, the federal government can support more basic research, make sure that
the states share information and research results are widely disseminated, and support
disclosure services. The federal government should also consider strengthening its
enforcement of existing federal laws that regulate interstate environmental and health effects.
Provide Research, Guidance, and Disclosure Services to the States
Chapter 1 noted the significant uncertainty that exists today regarding the nature and
magnitude of the risks presented by shale gas development. Scientists, policy-makers, and
regulators know that risks of various kinds exist, but are still struggling to understand their
severity and how to prioritize between them. In the meantime, contention and controversy
have arisen in ways that are making the public uncomfortable. Chapters 3 and 4 highlighted
the notable diversity of approaches that states are taking to regulate shale gas development
and enforce regulations. While this diversity can be a source of strength, in terms of fostering
policy innovation, and may also reflect legitimate variation in policy choices in different states,
it is also possible that this diversity reflects a lack of accurate information among the states
regarding the true nature of the risks they face or the regulatory options available to address
them.
A robust effort by the federal government to provide research, guidance, and disclosure
services to the states could go a long way towards remedying both of these situations. As
noted in Chapter 2, the Environmental Protection Agency is conducting a two-year study on the
threats posed to drinking water and groundwater by hydraulic fracturing. This study includes
not just the fracturing stage, in which water mixed with chemicals and proppants is injected
into a shale gas well, but also looks at the full lifespan of water in hydraulic fracturing, from
acquisition of the water, through the mixing of chemicals and actual fracturing, to the post-
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fracturing stage, including the management of flowback and produced water and its ultimate
treatment and disposal. This study will therefore touch on many of the key risks presented by
shale gas development and will hopefully define them more accurately and in greater detail
than exists today. Further research, however, is needed on subjects beyond hydraulic
fracturing and beyond potential impacts on groundwater. Topics requiring further research
include: impact on habitat of drilling pads, long-term integrity of well casing, air emissions,
cumulative impacts of water withdrawals, impacts caused by spills, migration of methane, and
disposal of the myriad types of waste products produced by the drilling process. In addition to
researching the sources and magnitudes of the risks posed by shale gas development,
additional research might also help to establish how effectively different regulatory responses
have been in mitigating these risks.
Wiseman suggests that creation of a federal clearinghouse could serve as a means for
communicating information about risk and best practices to state regulators. The author of
this thesis would add that an information clearinghouse, whether run by the federal
government or a nonprofit multi-stakeholder group such as STRONGER, could serve as a vehicle
for information exchange between state regulators regarding risks and best practices for
addressing them. That is, the clearinghouse would not only disseminate federal research to the
states, but also serve as a forum for information exchange among the states. Advisors from the
clearinghouse could provide technical assistance and training to states when they seek to
upgrade their regulatory practices. An interesting twist on the standard research-and-best-
practice functions of the clearinghouse would be to also include information about
enforcement practices among the various states. Collecting and disseminating comparative
analysis of enforcement practices would give policy-makers, regulators, and citizens in each
state a better understanding of how regulatory practices in their state compare to others
around the country.
Enforce Existing Federal Regulations
As noted in Chapter 5, the federal government should retain regulatory responsibility for those
externalities that have potential interstate effects. The federal government already regulates
air emissions that can cross state boundaries under the Clean Air Act, interstate water
contamination under the Clean Water Act, and seismic activity that can cross state lines
resulting from underground injection of wastewaters under the Safe Drinking Water Act.
Based on research findings regarding risk factors and effective mitigation, the EPA should
consider (and in some cases, is already considering) enhanced regulation and enforcement
activity on a few fronts. The agency should consider strengthening enforcement of regulations
402 Wiseman, "Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy."
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controlling air emissions, particularly methane emissions, under the Clean Air Act. The agency
should also consider tightening pretreatment and effluent standards for wastewater disposal in
publicly-owned treatment works under the Clean Water Act. Finally, the EPA regulates
injection of drilling wastes into Underground Injection Control Class 11 wells under the Safe
Drinking Water Act. After reports surfaced in Ohio that injection of wastewater into these wells
was the likely cause of earthquakes, the state updated its implementation and enforcement
practices under the Safe Drinking Water Act in recognition of this risk.403 EPA could encourage
other states with primacy to update their own regulation of underground injection control wells
as the agency did in encouraging Pennsylvania to bring its use of publicly-owned treatment
facilities into compliance with the Clean Water Act.
Conclusion
This thesis aspires to make a contribution to the ongoing debate about shale gas development
and hydraulic fracturing. Focusing on the role of the state in mitigating the risks associated
with shale gas development, I argue that, in most circumstances, state governments are better
situated to exercise regulatory authority over this type of economic activity than is the federal
government. Furthermore, building on my analysis of current regulatory practice, I present a
couple of ideas that both state governments and the federal government can pursue to
significantly improve regulatory outcomes and further the goals of protecting public health and
safety and protecting the environment without imposing unreasonable costs on an important
economic activity.
403 Palmer, "Ohio Agency Says Fracking-related Activity Caused Earthquakes."
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